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DETERMINANTS OF JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE: A STUDY OF 
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES IN THE UNITED STATES
This study focuses on: (1) the motivations for
international joint venture (IJV) formation in the United 
States ; (2) the bases and outcomes of bargaining between 
partners; and (3) the relationship between the outcomes of 
bargaining and joint venture performance. Forty U.S.-based 
joint ventures formed by U.S. firms with Japanese (22) and 
European (18) partners were studied. These IJVs operated 
in the manufacturing sector of the economy.
The results of the study show that both U.S. 
government regulations and/or attitudes (GRA) and 
business-related factors were significant motivators for 
IJV formation. However, business-related factors were much 
stronger motivators than GRA for the whole sample. 
Further, GRA was a stronger motivational factor for 
Japanese multinationals (MNCs) than for European (MNCs).---
The findings also indicated that high relative 
bargaining power (RBP) led to the use of appropriate 
partner selection criteria and to high equity ownership in 
the IJV. However, the level of RBP did not determine the 
exercise of management control or the level of cooperation 
between the partners.
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The results on the determinants of IJV performance 
revealed that: (1) the level of control exercised
significanlty impacted IJV performance; (2) the level of 
cooperation between partners significantly impacted 
performance; (3) no relationship was found between 
selection of partner in the same business as the IJV and 
IJV performance; and (4) no relationship was found between 
equity ownership and IJV performance; Additionally, there 
was evidence of differential control over the IJV’s 
functions. Specifically, the U.S. firm, the foreign 
partner and IJV management generally exercised control over 
different functional areas.
The study has a number of implications for strategy 
research and practice: (1) it provides an empirical base 
for explaining the motivations of U.S. firms and foreign 
MNCs that set up joint ventures in the U.S.; (2) it
provides an integrated model that, it is hoped, will guide 
future research on joint ventures ; (3) it provides an
empirical base for assessing the performance of joint 
ventures; and finally, (4) it suggests to those who run 
joint ventures factors that should receive emphasis in 
order to enhance joint venture performance.
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION
A. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
The role of the multinational corporation (MNC) in 
the international economic order continues to dominate 
research and writing in the field of international 
business. The conflict between governments and MNCs has 
not abated for the most part. However, the parties are 
now more accommodative of each other (Janger, 1980). 
Governments, especially those in the lesser developed 
countries (LDCs), have learned to accept MNCs as a 
necessary part of their efforts to develop their 
economies, while the MNCs have become more accomodating 
of the demands of these governments for a certain amount 
of control over their own destinies. A reflection of 
this mutual accommodation is the increasing use of joint 
ventures, although the general concensus of managers of 
MNCs is that they dislike joint ventures
{Tomlinson,1970; Killing, 1983). Kenneth Randall,
president of the Conference Board, has observed that:
1
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Out of such mutual need and complementary 
capabilities has been born a basis for 
cooperation. The organizational solution 
is the international joint venture 
(Janger, 1980:v).
Randall's comment reflects the conceptualization of 
international joint ventures as specially devised means 
of operating in LDCs. However, statistics derived from 
the Harvard Comparative Multinational Enterprise Project 
by Franko (1976) indicate that, by the mid-1970s, 
U.S.-based multinational firms were engaged in just as 
many joint ventures in the developed countries as they 
were in the lesser developed countries. There were 695 
IJVs in the developed countries compared to 681 IJVs in 
the lesser developed countries (Table 1.1).
TABLE 1.1





All 3720 2344 558 818
LDCs 1583 902 301 380
DCs 2137 1442 257 438
Source: Computed from tables in Franko, L. (1976).
The European Multinationals. Stamford, CT.: Greylock.
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These statistics may be indicative of the fact 
that the IJV is a universal form of business 
organization rather than a peculiarity of doing business 
in the LDCs.
This universality of IJVs is borne out by their 
increasing use in the DCs, including the United States. 
According to statistics released by the International 
Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
164 joint ventures were formed in the United States 
between U.S. companies and foreign partners within the 
three-year period 1981 and 1983: 47 in 1981, 79 in 1982 
and 38 in 1983. While these figures may not seem 
significant in relation to total foreign direct 
investment in the United States (about 4 percent), some 
of these joint ventures were very notable, such as the 
one between General Motors and Toyota of Japan.
In spite of their universal and almost equal use in 
both DCs and LDCs, however, the focus of research 
studies on joint ventures continues to be on outward 
flows from the DCs to the LDCs (Reynolds, 1984; Webley 
1974). It may be insightful to examine international 
joint ventures in the developed countries because of 
their increasing importance and use in these countries.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
B. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The research questions examined in this study are 
schematically presented in Figure 1.1. The elements 
shown in the figure provide the bases for the purpose of 
the study.
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This study first examines the motivations for joint 
venture formation in relation to foreign direct 
investment (FDI) theory. Second, the structure and 
behavior of the firms forming joint ventures is 
examined. The focus is on the relative bargaining power 
of the partners and its influence on the structure of 
the IJV and the behavior of IJV partners with respect 
to: (1) criteria for selecting partners, (2) equity 
ownership, (3) managerial control, and (4) cooperation.
Third, the impact of all the variables enumerated 
above on the performance of joint ventures is examined. 
A conceptual model of joint ventures is developed and 
tested using a sample of international joint ventures 
(IJVs) set up in the United States between European and 
Japanese firms and U.S. partners. The study sheds some 
light on research questions, such as:
1. What are the motivations of foreign MNCs and their 
U.S. partners for engaging in IJVs in the United 
States?
2. To what extent do U.S. government regulations 
and/or attitudes impact the decision to enter into 
joint ventures?
3. What is the basis of the relative bargaining power
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(RBP) of the partners, and how does RBP influence 
such behavioral factors as:
a. the criteria for the selection of partners,
b. the share of equity ownership,
c. the exercise of (managerial) control over
the IJV, and
d. the level of cooperation/conflict between
the partners?
4. How do the structural and behavioral factors 
affect the performance of the IJVs?
5. To what extent can these variables explain/predict 
joint venture performance, individually and 
collectively?
6. Does national origin of partners mediate the 
explanatory/predictive ability of these variables?
7. Do IJVs of one nationality perform better than 
those of other nationalities?
8. What are the major structural and behavioral 
differences between the joint ventures with 
partners from Europe as compared to those with 
partners from Japan?
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c, NEED FOR THE STUDY
This type of study is needed for three reasons. 
First, most of the research studies done on joint 
ventures (or on international businesses) have focused 
on advanced country MNCs that operate in developing 
countries (Reynolds, 1984). In fact, the bulk of the 
research has been on the operations of U.S.-based MNCs. 
However, the United States, in addition to being the 
single largest source of foreign direct investment, has 
also become the largest recipient of foreign direct 
investment, and this necessitates a shift in research
Secondly, researchers are unanimous in their 
prediction of the increasing use of IJVs (Friedmann and 
Kolmanoff, 1961; Drucker, 1973; Janger, 1980; Bivens and 
Lovell, 1966). This prediction is based on the
inability of even the largest firms to "go it alone" due 
to the rapid rate of technological development, the high 
cost of conducting research (R&D), the riskiness of 
projects, and the high costs involved in many projects 
(Killing, 1982; 1983; Harrigan, 1984). If such a
prediction is true, then there is a need for research 
that would provide insights into the workings and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ramifications of IJVs.
Thirdly, and even more importantly, a perusal of 
the IJV literature indicates that researchers have 
tended to focus only on specific aspects of IJVs, such 
as parent control. No integrated conceptual model has 
been developed to deal with the different facets of IJVs 
simultaneously and to guide research and strategic 
decision-making. This study fills these gaps by (1) 
redirecting research focus to include foreign MNC 
operations in the United States, (2) tying together the 
different streams of research on joint venture 
performance, (3) providing a comparative analysis of 
joint ventures between U.S. firms and MNCs from Europe 
and Japan, and (4) providing an integrated framework 
linking (a) the motivation for joint venture, (b) the 
behavior of partners and (c) joint venture performance.
D. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This study focuses on international joint ventures 
(based in the United States) between U.S. firms and 
partners from Japan and Europe. The selected joint 
ventures operate in the manufacturing sector (20-39 SIC
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Code) of the economy.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
The first chapter defines the research problem and 
sets forth the purpose, need and scope of the study. 
The next part of this section details the organization 
of the rest of the study.
Chapter two (LITERATURE REVIEW) presents a review 
of the existing literature, and is divided into four 
sections. Section one examines the motivation for IJV. 
Section two deals with the bases for the relative 
bargaining power (RBP) of partners and the outcomes of 
bargaining between them. Section three relates to the 
relationships between the outcomes of bargaining and IJV 
performance. The last section examines the literature 
on the measurement of IJV performance. A research model 
is developed based on the review of the literature.
Chapter three (THE RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES) 
develops the integrative conceptual model embodying the 
major determinants of joint venture performance. It 
sets forth the research propositions and hypotheses 
derived from the model and the hypothesized 
relationships among the variables in the model.
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Supporting evidence is provided for each of the 
hypotheses.
Chapter four (RESEARCH METHODOLOGY) details the 
research methodology used in the study and is divided 
into four sections. The first part describes the sample 
and discusses the development of the database. The next 
section presents the operationalization and measurement 
of the variables identified in the model. The third 
section details the methodology for the collection of 
data and the fourth section discusses the statistical 
analyses performed on the collected data.
Chapter five (RESEARCH RESULTS: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION) outlines the findings of this study. It 
also discusses contributions made to the development of 
theory and research and to strategic management decision 
making relative to IJVs.
Chapter six (CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS 
OF THE STUDY AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY) presents 
a summary of the research findings and examines the 
implications of the research. Areas for future research 
are indicated to motivate additional research on IJVs.
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Chapter II 
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter is divided into four sections. The 
first section examines the motivations of partners 
(foreign MNCs and local firms) for engaging in joint 
ventures. The second section deals with the bases for 
the relative bargaining power (RBP) of joint venture 
partners and the outcomes of the bargaining between 
them— criteria for selecting partner (CSOP), equity 
ownership (RELEO), management control (MC), and 
cooperation (CO). The third section reviews the 
literature on the relationship between the outcomes of 
the bargaining (CSOP, RELEO, MC, CO) and joint venture 
performance. The fourth section examines the literature 
on the measurement of joint venture performance.
MOTIVATION FOR INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE: FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT THEORY AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
The international joint venture (IJV) involves 
collaboration between an incoming foreign MNC and a 
local firm. Because of the emphasis in the literature
11
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on the need for MNCs to preserve their firm-specific 
advantages (FSAs) by internalizing their secret 
knowledge, (Magee, 197S; 1977; Dunning, 1977; 1979;
Buckley and Casson, 1976) such collaboration appears to 
represent an improper exposure of the two firms to the 
danger of losing their competitive advantages.
Eugman (1980), for example, avers in his 
Internalization Theory that:
...the technology cycle encourages the 
MN(C) to set up foreign subsidiaries... 
since the internalization will prevent 
loss of its information advantage to 
potential rivals (Eugman, 1980: 44).
Along the same lines, Lecraw (1984) asserts that:
In order to operate internationally, a 
firm must possess firm-specific
(ownership) advantages in technology, 
production, marketing, finance, and 
management...A (MNC) will undertake FDI 
when...its firm-specific advantages allow 
it to compete in the host country... and 
when the advantages of internalizing the 
transaction within the firm by FDI are 
greater than the advantages of (exporting 
or licensing) (1984: p. 28).
However, Magee (1976), in his Appropriability Theory. 
asserts that an MNC would reap the most appropriations 
from its developments in information through a 
wholly-owned subsidiary within which it would be able to 
preserve whatever secret knowledge it possesses.
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Two conclusions may be drawn from the above. FDI 
theorists (1) emphasize the internalization of MNCs* 
firm-specific advantages (FSA) to prevent the 
dissipation of z':=ir information or knowledge advantage, 
and (2) seem to preclude internationalization by firms 
before they have acquired significant firm-specific 
advantages that would permit wholly-owned or 
self-sufficient operations (SSO). For smaller firms, 
however, IJVs may be the only feasible means of entry 
into foreign countries or markets (Berlew, 1984),
While an IJV may not necessarily lead to the 
dissipation of a firm’s competitive or firm-specific 
advantages, its very nature presents opportunities for 
such dissipation. These opportunities arise because the 
partners may share resources, including facilities and 
personnel.
If the need to preserve FSA is so great, why then 
do MNCs engage in IJVs with local firms? The answer 
lies outside the scope of FDI theory because the theory 
does not provide a guide as to what the structure of 
foreign investment should be (wholly-owned or shared 
ownership). Neither does it explain the factors that 
determine such structures.
In order to determine the motivations for IJV, 
therefore, there is a clear need to extend FDI theory to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
include the form FDI takes and the determinants of such 
structure.
A search of the literature reveals that government 
regulations and/or attitudes and the need to pool 
resources motivate firms to enter into joint ventures in 
both the lesser developed countries (LDCs) and the 
developed countries (DCs). These factors, however, vary 
in the degree to which they influence the joint venture 
decison in LDCs and DCs. For example, in a study of 34 
joint ventures in developed countries. Killing (1983) 
found the motivations of the firms for entering into 
joint ventures to be: (1) government suasion or
legislation, (2) partner’s needs for other partner’s 
skills (technical, managerial), and (3) partner’s needs 
for the other partner’s attributes or assets. His 
definition of assets included items like cash and 
patents, while attributes included the use or 
manufacture of products. Seventeen percent of the joint 
ventures in Killing’s study were formed because of 
government suasion or regulations. Sixty-four percent 
were formed because of skills needed and 19 percent 
because of assets or attributes possessed by one partner 
and needed by the other partner.
In a study of joint ventures in LDCs, Beamish 
(1985) found that government suasion or legislation was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
given as the reason for the formation of 57 percent of 
the IJVs he studied. Need for the skills possessed by 
the partner accounted for 38 percent, while need for 
assets or attributes accounted for only 5 percent. A 
summary of the Killing and Beamish studies is provided 
in Table 2.1 below.
RELATIONSHIP OF STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT TO VENTURE-CREATION 
RATIONALES




ASSETS OR ATTRIBUTE NEEDED 19
SOURCE: Beamish, Paul W. The Characteristics of 
Joint Ventures in Developed and Developing Countries. 
Columbia Journal of World Business. Fall 1985, 
pp. 13-18.
Several other studies provide support for the 
motivations for joint venture formation. More 
specifically, LaPalombara and Blank (1979) found that 
joint ventures were mandated in Nigeria and Malaysia, 
but that in Brazil, where equity participation was not
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mandated, joint ventures were encouraged. To wit;
The government is clearly interested in 
encouraging joint ventures and is
stepping up pressures... in terms of
incentives and disincentives (it) will 
offer to the foreign investor (1979:105).
Friedmann and Kolmanoff (1961) report similar findings, 
citing the particular case of the Philippines where the 
government made it difficult to obtain approval for 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. In a study of 168 joint 
ventures in DCs and LDCs, Janger (1980) found that about 
fifty percent of the IJVs in his study were formed due 
to government suasion or legislation. Gullander (1976) 
concluded from a study involving interviews with twenty 
joint ventures that in both LDCs and DCs "nationalistic 
feelings" cause governments to impose formal and/or 
informal restrictions on foreign firms. To deal with 
such restrictions, these firms enter into joint ventures 
with local firms in order to acquire a local character. 
Finally, Tomlinson (1970) found from a study of IJVs in 
India and Pakistan that government suasion and 
legislation was the major motivation for entering into 
IJVs.
While the focus of most of the above studies has 
been on LDCs, the governments of developed countries 
have also been found to place restrictions on MNCs. For
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example, Friedmann and Kolmanoff (1961) found that 
Italian legislation was more liberal towards IJVs than 
wholly-owned subsidiaries. Lea and Webley (1972) 
reported that Sweden, Norway, Italy and France have 
either closed or restricted entry into significant 
portions of their economies. And Canada, under its 
"Canadianization" program, also restricts entry into 
certain sectors and uses tax incentives to increase the 
degree of Canadian participation.
Similar observations have been made with respect to 
investments in the United States, either as wholly-owned 
subsidiaries or as IJVs. For example, Webley (1974) 
found that fears of increasing trade protectionism in 
the United States have led to investments in the country 
to "get behind the barrier" (p. 25). Franko (1971), in 
a study of European firms in the United States, cited 
the existence or threat of U.S. tariffs, quotas and 
administrative regulations as providing the impetus for 
the investments. Negandhi and Baliga (1981) also found 
that, in the United States, legislations were passed 
both at the state and federal levels to curb the 
activities of foreign investors and MNCs. And more 
recently, Reich and Mankin (1986) have attributed the 
setting up of plants in the United States by Japanese 
companies, either as IJVs or wholly-owned subsidiaries.
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to efforts to "avert rising U.S. protectionist 
sentiment" (p. 78).
On the basis of the preceeding discussion, the 
motivation for IJVs may be attributed to: (1) government 
regulations and/or attitudes, and (2) the need to obtain 
resources from, or to pool resources with, other firms. 
It is the need for such resources that forms the basis 
of the collaboration between firms in the absence of 
government pressure. The term M-Factors (missing 
factors) is used here to denote such resources. The 
term combines the two factors (skills needed and assets 
or attributes needed) discussed by Killing (1983) and 
Beamish (1985) (see Table 2.1).
The discussion, thus far, has portrayed the MNC in 
a passive role. This, however, is not the case. The 
MNC is able to bargain for its choice of investment mode 
(either wholly-owned or shared ownership) on the basis 
of its firm-specific advantages (FSA) or
ownership-specific endowments (Dunning, 1977; 1979).
The M N C s  FSA make it attractive to the host country and 
form the basis of its bargaining power. These FSA are 
not only internally-developed but also embody the 
particular attributes of the M N C s  country of origin.
The FSA that the MNC brings to the host country is 
made up of proprietary intangible assets that, at least
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for a period of tine, ere exclusive or specific to the 
MNC. The range of FSA possessed by MNCs is rather broad 
but have been summarized into: 1. proprietary technology 
due to research activities, 2. managerial, marketing, or 
other skills specific to the organizational function of 
the firm, 3, product differentiation, trademarks, or 
brand names, 4. large size, reflecting scale economies, 
and 5. large capital requirements for plants of the 
minimum efficient size. (Dunning, 1977, 1979).
The FSA of the MNC are matched against the 
location-specific or country-specific advantages (CSA) 
of the host country. The CSA make the country 
attractive to the MNC. These country-specific 
advantages include natural resources, a pool of 
efficient and skilled low-cost labor, and trade barriers 
restricting imports (Rugman, Lecraw and Booth, 
1985:119). The degree of attractiveness of the 
country-specific advantages to the MNC influences the 
relative bargaining power of the MNC in relation to that 
of the host country. Thus, the more attractive the host 
country, the higher its bargaining power would be and 
the more it can use GRA to appropriate part of the MNC’s 
returns. Such GRAs lead the MNCs to seek local partners 
in an effort to acquire a local character (Fagre and 
Wells, 1982; Lecraw, 1984).
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The above discussion is summarized in Figure 2.1.
DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT STRUCTURE AND 
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Figure 2.1 indicates that the incoming MNC’s 
firm-specific advantages are likely to be mediated by 
two factors: (1) the set of government regulations
and/or attitudes (GRA) prevailing in the selected host 
country (Fagre and Wells, 1982; Lecraw, 1984), and (2) 
M-Factors which are essential resources not possessed by 
the incoming MNC but that are needed for effective and 
efficient (successful) operations. Such M-factors can 
be supplied by local firms in a joint venture 
arrangement and constitute the FSA of the local firms.
The term M-Factors is rather broad and. encompasses 
nany types of resources. These M-Factors can be 
classified into three major categories:
1. Production-related M-Factors
-technology, including patents and licences 
(Kail, 1984; Killing, 1983; Papavassi1ion,
1975; Reynolds, 1984);
-economies of scale (Gullander, 1976; Killing, 
1983; Litvak, 1984);
-capital (Hall, 1984; Killing, 1983; Simons,
1979);
-workers, both managerial and skilled 
(Tomlinson, 1370; Friedmann and Kolmanoff,
1961)
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-raw materials/components (Litvak, 1984; 
Papavassilion, 1975; Hall, 1984).
2. Market-related M-Factors
-channels of distribution, both internal and 
external (Walter and Murray, 1982; Gullander, 
1976; Papavassilion, 1975);
-suppliers (Gullander, 1976; Papavassilion, 
1975; Walter and Murray, 1982);
-customers (Gullander, 1976; Papavassilion, 
1975; Walter and Murray, 1982);
-speed of market entry (Stopford & Haberick, 
1976)
-established brands (Gullander, 1976);
3. Socio-politico-cultural M-Factors 
-host government relations, including
preferential treatment low-cost loans, tax 
breaks and other incentives (Simons, 1979; 
Hall, 1984; Walter and Murray, 1982);
-local image (Simons, 1977; Hall, 1984;
Walter and Murray, 1982);
-understanding of local laws, customs and 
mores (Hall, 1984; Walter and Murray, 1982). 
-Spreading risk (Litvak, 1984; Hall, 1984;
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Papavassilion, 1975).
The interaction between (1) the foreign MNC’s 
firm-specific advantages (FSA), (2) the government 
regulations and/or attitudes prevailing in the host 
country (GRA), and (3) the FSA of the local firm, based 
on the resources it can supply in an IJV arrangement 
(M-factors), essentially determines the form the MNC’s 
investment takes: a self-sufficient operation (SSO) or a 
non-self sufficient operation.
One of the non-self sufficient operations is 
sharing ownership in an IJV. The MNC would prefer to 
have a SSO where:
1. it has all of the resources it needs and there 
are no adverse GRA,
2. it has all the resources it needs and can 
overcome any adverse GRA there may be,
3. it does not have all the resources but can 
readily acquire them either through purchasing them, 
contracting for them, or acquiring local firms that 
possess them.
From the above presentation, two propositions may 
be derived:
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Proposition 1:
An IJV results from an MNC’s inability to 
overcome the regulations and/or attitudes 
of the host country, and/or
Proposition 2:
An IJV represents an MNC’s inability to 
engage in a self-sufficient operation 
(SSO) due to the lack of, and the 
inability to readily acquire, essential 
resources (M-Factors) required for 
operating in a selected foreign country.
The literature reviewed in this section focused on 
the motivation for joint venture formation. The 
interaction of (1) the FSA of the MNC (2) the FSA of the 
local firm, and (3) the country-specific advantages of 
the host country, including its regulations and/or 
attitudes towards foreign investments, was found to 
determine the form of the MNC’s investment 
(self-sufficient operation (SSO) or non-self-sufficient 
operation (NSSO).
Of the two investment forms identified above (SSO 
and (NSSO), only the non-self sufficient form is of 
interest in this study. Specifically, the focus of this 
study is on IJVs because of their increasing importance. 
Their general acceptance and popularity seems to 
indicate that the ability of firms, regardless of their
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size, to operate on their own, has been greatly eroded 
by today’s universally dynamic business environment 
(Harrigan, 1984:7).
Specific questions that arise from the review are: 
To what extent do government regulations and/or 
attitudes lead to the formation of IJVs in the United 
States? What resources do MNCs from Japan and Europe 
contribute to IJVs in the United States, and what 
resources do U.S. firms contribute to IJVs? If the 
assertion by Rugman, et al. <1985:91-92) that MNCs 
contribute technology while local firms contribute a 
knowledge of the local environment is true, then U.S. 
partners could be expected to seek mainly technology 
from their foreign partners while providing them access 
into U.S. markets. This assertion is examined in this
The next section deals with the bargaining between 
the MNC and the local firm in structuring the IJV.
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B. BASES FOR BARGAINING AND THE OUTCOMES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL JOINT ^TENTURES
This section deals with the behavior of firms in 
organizing and operating the IJV.
Once the IJV form of investment has been selected, 
either due to government legislation/suasion or to the 
need for resources (M-Factors), strategic decisions have 
to be made with respect to how the IJV will be
structured and operated. Unlike in wholly-owned 
operations, however, such decisions are not easy to
make. This is because an IJV involves the sharing of 
decision-making with another firm. One partner firm, 
therefore, cannot make unilateral decisions with regards 
to the structuring and operations of the joint venture. 
All decisions affecting the IJV will need to be made
either with the partner or with the partner’s consent.
The relationship between the partners is further 
complicated by the fact that while they share 
decision-making with respect to the IJV, each of them 
simultaneously pursues its own organizational goals. 
Since these goals may be different, or even conflict in 
some cases, each partner would like to have the IJV
structured and operated according to its preferences.
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How the IJV is actually structured and operated 
will be determined through bargaining. That is, the 
relative bargaining power (RBP) of the partners will 
determine the assignment of roles and responsibilities 
and the allocation of benefits (Schaan, 1983; Bafii, 
1978; Fagre and Wells, 1982; Lecraw, 1984).
The resources possessed by MNCs have been shown to 
be the bases for their relative bargaining power (Fagre 
and Wells, 1982; Lecraw, 1984). (This point will be 
explored fully in later sections). For joint ventures, 
however, and for the purposes of this study, the
resources actually contributed to the joint venture 
forms the bases of the relative bargaining power of the 
partners.
Specifically, each partner will need to decide the 
types of resources and the amounts of these resources 
that will be committed to the IJV to ensure that the
partner gets that level of relative bargaining power
necessary for attaining its objectives.
Because the bargaining process cannot be directly 
observed, the focus will be on the outcomes of the
bargaining between the partners : (1) the criteria used 
for the selection of partner; (2) the degree of equity 
ownership attained; (3) the areas of the IJVs 
operations over which control was obtained; and (4) the
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level of cooperation between partners. What follows is 
a review of the four variables listed above and their 
relationship to relative bargaining power.
1. RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER AND CRITERIA FOR SELECTING 
PARTNER
The majority of MNC managers who have been engaged 
in IJVs are convinced that the local partner is very 
important for successful operations (Walter and Murray, 
1982; danger, 1980; Tomlinson, 1970). Yet only a few 
researchers have attempted to develop a list of the 
variables that lead to the selection of particular 
partners (Tomlinson, 1970; Franko, 1969; 1972). Some
researchers feel that it is not a "useful exercise" to 
develop such a list since the relevance of selection 
criteria can only be determined post hoc (Killing 
1983).
The bases for the selection of partners have been 
classified into six categories by Tomlinson (1970). 
These are:
1. pressure to select a particular partner, either 
directly or indirectly by government regulations 
and/or attitudes ;
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2. facilities possessed by local firm, like plants, 
marketing or distribution facilities or a strong 
market position;
3. resources, such as managerial and technical 
personnel, materials, components or local capital;
4. status, both in the sense of financial and 
business soundness, and in the ability to deal 
with local authorities and engender good 
public relations;
5. past association as agent, customer, licensee or a 
partner in other undertakings; and
6. capacity to provide a local identity.
Both Tomlinson (1970) and Friedmann and Kolmanoff 
(1961) found that the possession of managerial skills 
was the most important criterion for the selection of 
specific partners. Also, MNCs that possessed resources 
that the host government considered important to its 
development program were free to select their own 
partners. This implies that resource possessions 
granted higher bargaining power to the MNCs.
The role the partner is expected to play has been 
used as a basis for selection. Franko (1976) found a 
general aversion by U.S. multinationals for partners who 
might exercise active management control. Stopford and
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Wells (1972) also found that MNCs selected particular 
* partners only where they could retain control over what 
they considered important decision-making areas. While 
the role a partner is expected to play has been used as 
a selection criterion, this is more appropriately an 
issue of control and would, therefore, be discussed 
under control.
Firm strategy has also been found to influence the 
selection of partners. For example, Vernon (1971) found 
that MNCs with broad product lines (diversified) 
tolerated active partners whereas those with narrow 
lines only accepted local partners with weak bargaining 
positions. MNCs that are highly diversified have been 
found to depend on local partners to provide active 
management (Brash, 1966).
Eleven different criteria for selecting joint 
venture partners were identified in the above review. 
These are 1. pressure by government regulations or 
suasion, 2. facilities, 3. resources, 4. status, 5. past 
association, 6. local identity, 7. role, 8. firm 
strategy, 9. size, 10. nationality, and 11. general 
soundness.
There were no selections on the bases of similarity 
of partners’ businesses or the similarity of the foreign 
partner’s business to the IJV’s business. However,
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among the more pertinent questions for IJV partner 
selection in the United States would be: how does the
relatedness of the partners* business influence the 
selection of partners? Stated otherwise, are Japanese 
and European MNCs using IJVs as a means of horizontal or 
vertical expansion into the U.S. market or are they 
diversifying into other areas through IJVs? Does 
selection on the basis of past association lead to 
better cooperation and performance?
Similarity of business is important in this study 
in order to test the assertions of FDI theorists, 
especially Internalization theorists (Magee, 1976; 1977; 
Dunning, 1977; 1979; Hymer, 1976), that MNCs internalize 
their FSA in other countries due to market 
imperfections, both natural and government-imposed. If 
such assertions are true, then, as Caves (1982) has 
found, the investments MNC’s make in other countries 
should be either horizontal or vertical rather than 
diversifications into other industries.
For the purposes of this study, four selection 
criteria were used. These are: (1) complementarity of 
resources contributed by partners to the IJV, including 
facilities and resources ; (2) past association between 
partners (either as agent, customer, partner, etc.); (3) 
relatedness of partners’ business; and (4) relatedness
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of the foreign partner’s business and IJV’s business.
Due to the large number of potential IJV partners 
available to select from and the level of development of 
the countries of interest in this study— United States, 
Japan and Europe— the choice of a partner will depend 
solely on the types and amounts of resources that
potential partners are willing to make available to the 
IJV. The same will hold true for IJVs in LDCs if two 
conditions can be met. The first condition is the 
absence of governmental coercion to select a particular 
partner. The second condition is the availability of a 
number of suitable potential partners to select from. 
This would imply that the more resources a firm can
contribute to a joint venture, the greater the
likelihood that it would be selected as a partner. In
essence, the relative bargaining power of the potential 
partners determines who is selected and the bases for 
the selection.
2. RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER AND EQUITY OWNERSHIP
The level of equity ownership held in a joint 
venture determines which of the partners has the de 
jure right to make decisions for the joint venture
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(Guilander, 1976). However, this right may or may not 
be exercised. Also, one partner cannot unilaterally 
decide what the level of equity ownership would be in 
the new venture. Such a decision would have to be 
negotiated with the level of actual equity ownership 
attained depending on bargaining between the partners. 
As noted earlier, such bargaining power depends of the 
type and amounts of resources contributed to the joint 
venture.
Fagre and Wells (1982) conducted a study to examine 
the level of equity ownership attained through 
bargaining between MNCs and host government in Latin 
America. They used such variables as technology, access 
to export markets, capital, and product diversification 
possessed by the MNCs to represent their bargaining 
power. They found that the degree of equity ownership 
obtained was positively related to the level of
technology, positively related to the degree of product 
differentiation, positively related to access to foreign 
markets, but negatively related to the number of
multinational competitors in the market.
Fagre and Wells (1982) also found that the
financial resources held by the MNCs were not an 
important source of bargaining power in Latin America. 
This was because seven countries with the most
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restrictive policies regarding foreign ownership had 40 
percent of all U.S. manufacturing affiliates in Latin 
America but only 20 percent of the largest investments. 
This led them to two conclusions: (1) that perhaps MNCs 
tended to place their largest investments in the less 
restrictive countries because they realized that size 
did not give them greater bargaining power, and (2) that 
the insignificance of capital for the MNC in the 
bargaining process was due to the increasing number of 
alternative sources of capital available to developing 
countries (p. 16).
In addition, Fagre and Wells found that MNCs that 
produced several product lines had a higher level of 
ownership than single-product line firms. They offered 
four different explanations but noted that "no 
convincing evidence was available to favor any 
particular interpretation" (p. 21). Their
interpretations were:
1. Product diversity may be related to management 
skills. Larger plants, simultaneously manufacturing 
many goods in different lines, may require a higher 
level of management expertise. If this is indeed the 
case, then management skills would reflect a resource 
needed by many developing countries.
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2. Multiproduct affiliates may fit into an
import-substitution development strategy. Host
developing countries may therefore prefer a multiproduct 
firm with the capability to produce acre goods that were 
formerly imported to a single-product firm.
3. Seventy percent of all affiliates in Latin
America that manufacture four or more 3-digit SIC 
product lines are concentrated in three major
industries— chemicals (except drugs and cosmetics),
non-electrical machinery, and electrical machinery. If 
these industries play a special role in the development 
programs of Latin American countries, then the 
relationship between product diversity and bargaining 
success may be a reflection of the need for these 
investors.
4. The observed relationship between ownership
levels and product diversity is a result of the
structure of governmental regulations in the host 
countries. Corporations may tend to create a separate 
subsidiary whenever they are dealing with a product line 
in which the government will insist upon some measure of 
local control. Firms in that situation would have more
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subsidiaries, fewer multiproduct affiliates, and fewer 
wholly-owned affiliates (p. 18).
Lecraw (1984) also used a bargaining power 
framework in his study of the level of equity ownership 
attained by 153 subsidiaries of United States, European, 
Japanese and Third-World MNCs in seven ASEAN countries. 
Re found a strong positive relationship between relative 
bargaining power, as proxied by resource possessions, 
and the level of equity ownership attained by the MNCs. 
That is, the higher the relative bargaining power of the 
MNCs, the higher their level of equity ownership.
Although the focus of the Fagre and Wells (1982) 
and the Lecraw (1984) studies was on bargaining between 
MNCs and host governments (not local firms), the 
analysis is applicable to bargaining between MNCs and 
local firms that are potential joint venture partners. 
In fact, host governments have been regarded as 
bargaining agents for the local firms since most of 
their demands are for sharing equity ownership with 
local firms rather than with the governments themselves 
(Reynolds, 1984; Friedmann and Kolmanoff, 1961; 
Friedmann and Beguin, 1971). The same sources of 
bargaining power should therefore be relevant whether 
the bargaining is with host government or with private
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
firms in the host country.
Other researchers have reported the strategic use 
of equity ownership. For example, Friedmann and 
Beguin (1971) found that MNCs were indifferent to 
majority equity ownership except in cases involving 
complex technology, the need to protect company secrets 
or where majority control represented collateral to 
foreign and international lending institutions.
Stopford and Wells (1972) found that MNCs 
determined the level of equity ownership desired on the 
basis of their overall strategy. A higher level of 
equity ownership was sought where it was considered 
important to exercise more decision-making authority 
with respect to the joint venture’s operations.
Two important points were made in the presentation 
on equity ownership. The degree of equity ownership 
attained is: (1) an important bargaining issue for
governments, host country firms and MNCs; and (2) 
dependent upon the relative bargaining positions of the 
parties. However, a significant question still remains 
to be answered. Since most of the studies reviewed here 
were done outside the United States, or in LDCs, and did 
not pertain solely to IJVs, will the same relationships 
hold in IJVs in the United States? To examine the 
applicability of these findings in the context of the
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United States, the bargaining framework will be utilized 
for IJVs in the United States.
Before concluding this section an important note 
should be made. Some MNCs reportedly use a minority 
equity ownership as a deliberate strategy to hedge 
against political and economic risks— nationalization, 
devaluation or foreign exchange blockage, and excessive 
taxation (Friedmann and Beguin, 1971). While the 
importance of such a strategy is recognized, the use of 
such strategy in U.S. joint ventures is not examined in 
this study.
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3. RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER AND MANAGEMENT CONTROL
In an IJV, unilateral decision making by one 
partner does not wholly determine the strategic 
decision-making process. Final decisions (outcomes) are 
a result of bargaining between the partners. The 
partners bring forth their own strategies to the 
bargaining table for negotiation. Control, to a large 
extent, determines the extent to which one partner 
predominates with respect to particular functions of the 
IJV. Hence, another area for strategic decision-making 
is the determination of the areas of the IJV’s 
operations to control and the amount of control to 
exercise over the selected areas. This section reviews 
the literature on control that pertains to IJVs and 
attempts to indicate the linkages between relative 
bargaining power and control.
A review of the literature reveals that the 
distinction between equity ownership and control is not 
very clear. That is, some firms consider equity 
ownership to be tantamount to control and therefore 
desire high levels of equity ownership as a means of 
acquiring control.
Gullander. (1976), for example, asserts that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
management control is said to exist for a company that 
has the majority equity share. Brooke and Remmers 
(1978) also found that most managers equated equity 
ownership with control and therefore preferred 100 
percent ownership. Such complete equity ownership may, 
however, be repugnant to an IJV. Negandhi and Baliga 
(1981) found that the desire for 100 percent ownership 
was not restricted to U.S. MNCs. They found that 
European and Japanese MNCs also desired 100 percent 
ownership. However, they report that European and 
Japanese MNCs appear to have reconciled themselves to 
the leverage of host governments and have readilly 
accepted minority positions. Franko (1971:a) found a 
predilection of U.S. MNCs for either sole ownership or 
majority ownership where sole ownership was not 
possible. Even governments have been found to equate 
equity ownership with control. Behrman (1970) found 
that governments demanded majority local equity 
ownership as a means of ensuring control over joint 
venture operations.
Gullander (1976) and Friedmann and Kolmanoff (1961) 
distinguish between "voting control" or de jure 
control, which is the power of a parent to control the 
joint venture that accrues to it from its majority share 
of ownership, and de facto control, which is the
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effective or managerial control a partner actually
exercises over the joint venture. Friedmann and 
Kolmanoff (1961) found that MNCs were able to exercise 
de facto control even with minority ownership 
positions. Such control was exercised through : (1)
supplementary agreements for things like patents,
licenses, lease of equipment, supply of technical 
assistance, and exclusive sales agency; (2) 
representation on the board; and (3) assignment of veto 
power in certain decision areas, like the transfer of 
stock to third parties. They also found that the 
possession of specialized knowledge or resources enabled
the MNC to exercise effective control. These findings
implicitly equate the level of control exercised with 
the bargaining power of the MNCs, as determined by the 
resources they contributed to the IJV.
In a study focusing on the bargaining power of MNCs 
and host governments (cited earlier), Lecraw (1984) 
found a positive relationship between the relative 
bargaining power of the MNC and the level of control 
exercised over the areas of operation of its 
subsidiaries that the MNC considered critical to 
success. However, he did not find a close relationship 
between equity ownership and effective control. Some 
MNCs with low equity ownership in their subsidiaries had
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a high degree of control over the critical success 
variables in their subsidiaries and vice versa. Some 
MNCs were able to control their subsidiaries in the LDCs 
"by means other than through their share of the equity 
in their subsidiary" (p. 38).
This supports earlier findings (Gullander, 1976; 
Friedmann and Komanoff, 1961 and Schaan, 1983) that 
distinguish between de .jure control and de facto 
control. This distinction is further reinforced by 
Lecraw’s (1984) other findings with respect to Japanese 
MNCs. He found that Japanese MNCs typically took a 
lower level of equity ownership in LDCs than U.S. or 
European MNCs. However, the Japanese firms managed to 
retain a higher level of control over their 
subsidiaries. This clearly implies a difference between 
control accruing from equity ownership and actual 
control exercised.
The most far-reaching study on IJV control is the 
work done by Schaan (1983). In a study of 10 
Hexican-Canadian joint ventures in Mexico, he examined 
the concept of control, the determination of what and 
how to control, and how managers managed the control 
function. He found that:
* control was exercised within specific contexts with 
each parent controlling specific activities or decisions
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rather than one parent having total control;
* in addition to control mechanisms already found by 
previous researchers— authority over decisons or veto 
power (Friedmann and Kolmanoff, 1961; Gullander, 1976), 
contractual agreements (Friedmann and Kolmanoff, 1961; 
Friedmann and Beguin, 1971); and staffing (Dang, 1977; 
Philips, 1970)— parents also used more subtle means of 
influencing the decisions and/or activies of joint 
ventures. Among these are:
(a) organizational processes: planning, capital 
budgeting ;
(b) organisational systems : reporting, bonus, reward 
and punishment, promotion, JV’s policies and procedures, 
staff services and training programs ;
(c) informal mechanisms: visits, meetings with IJV 
managers and phone calls.
He also found that control was exercised through 
the persuasion of the partner but was often determined 
by the outcome of bargaining. Schaan*s (1983) findings 
also introduce the concept of positive and negative 
parent control of joint ventures. Positive control 
existed where managers were in a position to influence 
decisions or activities in a way consistent with their 
interests. Negative control was used to block decisions 
by preventing their implementation.
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The relationship between relative bargaining power 
and control was examined in this section. It was 
pointed out that equity ownership has, in some cases, 
been equated with control. For the purposes of this 
study, a clear distinction is made between de .jure 
control and de facto control. Control, in the context 
of this study, refers to de facto control. That is, 
the actual managerial control exercised over the 
operations of the joint venture. The specific research 
question for which answers will be sought is: "How does 
the relative bargaining power of joint venture partners, 
proxied by their contributions to the IJV, affect the 
amount of managerial control they exercise over the 
IJVs functions?"
4. RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER AND COOPERATION
The third area of strategic decision-making relates 
to the relationship between relative bargaining power 
and cooperation between the partners in a joint venture. 
To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, no studies 
have been done on the relationship between relative 
bargaining power and cooperation between joint venture 
partners. This section, therefore, borrows from equity
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theory and the literature on power and conflict.
Robey (1982) has noted that organizations are more 
often arenas for conflict than competition (p. 144).
However, joint ventures provide unique opportunities for 
both conflict and competition. This is because the 
formation of a joint venture creates, at the least, a 
three-way linkage (with two partners) between the 
partners and the joint venture (Figure 2.2).
FIGURE 2.2
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Although these linkages may be very close or very 
loose, all the entities taken together could be regarded 
as a "mega-organization". Such a concept of a 
"mega-organization" makes it possible to apply the 
concepts of power and conflict already developed in the 
organization theory literature to joint ventures.
Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) define power as the 
"ability to get things done the way one wants them to be 
done" (1977:4). Since conflict is the interference by 
one party in the goal achievement of another party, 
conflict then is possible only if the interfering party 
has some power (Robey, 1982:145).
The power of one joint venture partner to interfere
with the goal attainment of another partner depends on a
number of factors. First, joint venture partners may 
pursue different, or even conflicting, organizational
goals. Such pursuit of "sub unit" goals represents 
suboptimization since it may detract from the attainment 
of mega-organizational goals. Mega-organizational goals 
would be attained in situations where the goals of the 
partners and of the joint venture are met
simultaneously.
Secondly, as has been established earlier, the 
relative bargaining power of joint venture partners is 
based upon the amount and importance of the resources
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they contribute to the joint venture. It follows, 
therefore, that the more resources one partner 
contributes relative to the other partner, the more 
power the partner would have to influence and/or 
interfere with the goal attainment of the other party.
Thirdly, the joint venture relationship creates the 
opportunity for competition. Such competition could be 
either between the partners or between the joint venture 
and a partner or partners (Harrigan, 1984). Schmidt and 
Eochan (1972) note that in competition, the outcome 
depends only on one’s own goal-directed behavior and not 
on interference with another’s goal-directed behavior. 
However, such competition could develop into conflict 
where : (1) the partners either operate in the same 
markets or industry, (2) compete in other markets, (3) 
depend on each other, or (4) depend on the joint venture 
for essential supplies or resources.
Using the mega-organization concept, all the 
sources of conflict identified by organizational theory 
researchers would apply to joint ventures. The first of 
these is differentiation. This involves "the difference 
in cognitive and emotional orientaion among managers in 
different functional departments" (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967, p. 11). Joint venture partners and even joint 
ventures themselves may operate in different industries
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and markets and pursue divergent goals (Gullander, 1976, 
Killing, 1982; Harrigan, 1984).
The second source of potential conflict between 
partners is task interdependence. Task interdependence 
falls into four categories: 1. pooled, 2. sequential, 3. 
reciprocal, (Thompson, 1967), and 4. team (Van de Yen, 
Delbeq and Koenig, Jr., 1976). The linkages created 
between the different parties by the formation of a 
joint venture may involve any of the four 
interdependencies above. Figure 2.3 illustrates some of 
these interdepencies.
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Task interdependence presents opportunities for 
interference and goal blocking that otherwise would not 
exist. The greater the interdependence among groups, 
the greater the potential for conflict (Robey, 1982, 
Thompson, 1967).
The third source of potential conflict between 
partners arises from the need to share resources. One 
of the motivations for setting up joint ventures is the 
need of partners to pool or share resources (Killing, 
1982; 1983; Gullander, 1976). Who contributes what is 
determined through bargaining. The IJV, therefore, 
represents a sharing arrangement within which partners 
may not want to freely share their resources for fear of 
losing their firm-specific advantages. Such
unwillingness to freely share, or to hold back, could 
lead to conflict.
The fourth source of potential conflict between 
partners involves power sharing. Joint ventures involve 
the sharing of power and decision-making between 
partners and joint venture management. Whether there 
will be conflict or not depends on the balance of power 
between the parties. Conflict is more likely to develop 
where power is equally balanced, where each party has a 
basis for power and can influence the other’s behavior
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in certain ways. Where power is unbalanced, there is 
less potential for conflict because one party can 
dominate the other (Robey, 1982:159).
Three factors have been identified as contributing 
to the basis of power. Hinnings, Hickson, Pennings, 
Schneck (1974) found coping with task uncertainty "the 
variable most critical to power" based on their study of 
intraorganizational power. The second factor that 
increases the power of an entity is its location in the 
workflow. The more central the position, the more one 
can control the flow of information to others within an 
organization, and the higher one’s power. The third 
source of power is resources controlled. Where units 
become dependent on others for resources (money, 
personnel, materials, information) their action may be 
successfully influenced (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974). 
Such dependencies are created in IJVs (Figure 2.3)
Given the high potential for conflict within joint 
ventures, cooperation, or the lack of conflict, then 
becomes an important issue for joint venture partners. 
Janger (1980:5) has noted that "...shared equity 
holdings alone do not make a joint venture in the 
absence of a reason for cooperation".
The importance of parent cooperation is indicated 
by the general reference to joint ventures as
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"marriages" and the partners as "parents". Perhaps, 
"living together" may be a better term since a true 
marriage involves the joining of two parties into one 
entity. A JV still retains the two parents as separate 
entities and therefore represents a "living together" or 
sharing arrangement. Weston (1984:63) has observed
A joint venture is not a marriage 
intended to bind the parties for 
eternity. Rather, it is a temporary 
arrangement that the parties will 
terminate when short-term needs have been 
satisfied.
A similar view is expressed by Killing (1983:128) who
When freely formed, that is, without the 
interference of governments, joint 
ventures are solutions to what are 
essentially temporary problems... so most 
joint ventures will and should come to an
Given that JVs are temporary unions for the mutual 
benefit of the partners, they appear to go through a 
three-stage life cycle. There is an engagement, a 
period of mutual coexistence, and an eventual 
disengagement. Following this life cycle, a JV 
cooperation lifecycle can be posited that is akin to the 
foreign investment lifecycle developed by Haner (1980).
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Cooperation between the partners should start slowly as 
they feel each other out, increase when the partners 
find coamon ground for the satisfaction of their own 
objectives, and decline as their need for each other 
declines. Such a concept is supported by Berg and 
Friedman (1980) who allude to "three phases in joint 
ventures: the burst of activity and negotiation
reflecting the courtship, the creation and nurture of 
the child, and separation" (p. 85).
Killing’s (1983) findings provide empirical support 
for the cooperation lifecycle concept. He found that 13 
out of 19 (68%) partners could not have done without 
their partners at the time their JVs were formed. After 
several years, only six (31%) could still not do without 
their partners.
The excessive use or misuse of power, attempts to 
enforce decisions made without the consent of the 
partner, abuse of trust and perceived inequity (Adams, 
1963) have all been pointed to as reducing cooperation 
between partners (Friedmann, Kolmanoff, 1961; Friedmann 
and Beguin, 1971; Killing, 1982, 1983; Wright, 1977;
Burton and Saelens, 1982).
Cooperation between parents presents a paradox. 
Cooperation between partners is necessary for effective 
joint venture performance. However, cooperation may
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imply the dissipation of firm-specific advantages, 
especially where firms’ technical cores are exposed to 
partners who may turn out to be competitors in the
Based on the preceding discussion, a pertinent 
research question may be posed. That is: "To what
extent does the relative bargaining power of joint 
venture partners, as proxied by the resources they 
contribute to the joint venture, impact the nature of 
the cooperation between them?
SUMMARY
This section has evaluated the bargaining behavior 
of the partner firms in determining (1) criteria for 
selecting partner, (2) equity ownership, (3) managerial 
control, and (4) cooperation. The presentation in this 
section is summarized in Figure 2.4 below.
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The next section examines the relationship between the 
outcomes of bargaining and joint venture performance.
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c. OUTCOMES OF BARGAINING AND JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE
This section deals with the relationship between 
the four outcomes of the bargaining process— criteria 
for the selection of a partner, equity ownership, 
managerial control and cooperation— and joint venture 
performance.
1. PARTNER SELECTION CRITERIA AND JOINT VENTURE 
PERFORMANCE
Tomlinson’s (1970) study established a relationship 
between criteria for selecting a partner and joint 
venture performance. He found that joint ventures in 
which partners were chosen on the basis of favorable 
past association were the most profitable. The second 
most profitable were those in which partners were 
selected on the basis of convenience of facilities or 
resources. Third was selection of partner on the basis 
of status or local identity. Joint ventures in which 
MNCs were forced to select particular partners had the 
lowest level of profitability.
Among the more pertinent questions for partner 
selection in the United States would be: how does the
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relatedness of the partners* business impact the 
performance of the IJV? How does the relatedness of the 
partner’s business to that of the IJV impact the IJV’s 
performance? How does the complementarity of the 
resources supplied to the IJV by the partners impact the 
IJV’s performance? and, Does selection of a partner on 
the basis of past association lead to better 
perf ormance?
2. EQUITY OWNERSHIP AND JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE
Several researchers have found a relationship 
between the degree of equity ownership attained and 
joint venture performance. Killing (1983), Beamish and 
Lane (1982), and Friedmann and Beguin (1971) have all 
found that the performance of IJVs was highest where 
equity ownership was not equally divided between the 
partners. Killing (1983) and Beamish and Lane (1982) 
found that the relationship between joint venture 
success and equity ownership was "U-shaped". That is, 
joint ventures in which the MNC held a small minority 
share (control was with the local partner) or a large 
majority share (control was with the MNC) tended to be 
more successful than joint ventures in which partners
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held roughly equal shares (control was split).
A similar finding was made by Lecraw (1984) in his 
study of bargaining power, ownership and pi-ofitability 
of MNCs in developing countries. However, he found a 
"J-shaped" relationship between equity ownership and 
performance.
Since the studies reviewed here were either done 
outside the United States, or focused on joint ventures 
and subsidiaries of MNCs that were not in the United 
States, the pertinent question is whether the same 
relationships would prevail in IJVs in the United
3. MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE
Parent control has also been found to relat to IJV 
performance. In the Lecraw (1984) study cited earlier, 
he also found "... a close (positive) linear 
relationship between the level of control a (M)NC had 
over the areas of operation of its subsidiaries that 
were critical to success, and the success of the 
investment from the (M)NC’s viewpoint." (p. 38) That
is, the higher the effective control, the higher the 
success from the MNC’s viewpoint. The relationship
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between the overall management control and the success 
of the subsidiary was roughly "J-shaped". Low success 
occurred when ownership and overall control were roughly 
equally divided between the MNC and its local partner.
A study of 37 joint ventures between North American 
and European partners by Killing (1983) found a 
relationship between parent control and joint venture 
performance. On the basis of control, he developed a 
typology that classified joint ventures into (1) 
dominant parent— one parent ran the venture like a 
wholly-owned subsidiary with its own functional 
managers, (2) shared management— both parents play a 
meaningful managerial role with functional managers from 
both parents, and (3) independent ventures— where the 
joint venture general manager has a free hand to make 
decisions. He found that dominant parent joint ventures 
were more successful than shared ownership ventures 
while independent ventures were the most successful. 
Friedmann and Beguin (1971) also found that shared 
control led to low performance while unequal control led 
to higher performance.
Rafii (1978) examined the impact of foreign parent 
control on the transfer of technology to Iranian joint 
ventures. Using a sample of 35 IJVs, he found that the 
joint venture partners pursued divergent objectives
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
which led to conflicts. The foreign partners were found
to push for maximization of the net benefits of their
global operations while the local partners sought to 
maximize return to the IJV. Rafii found that the
resolution of such conflicts and the ultimate
distribution of costs and rewards were a function of the 
relative control that each partner exercised over the 
joint venture’s policies and operations. He found that 
such exercise of control was positively related to the 
joint venture’s performance.
Schaan (1983) found that the most successful joint 
ventures in his sample were those for which managers in 
the parent firm achieved a fit between their criteria of 
success, the activities or decisions they controlled and 
the mechanisms they used to exercise control.
From the foregoing, it is clear that partners 
exercise control over specific functional areas rather 
than overall control and that such control is directly 
related to joint venture performance. For the purposes 
of this study, therefore, an attempt would be made to 
determine the functional areas over which each partner 
(and IJV management) exercises control and how the 
exercise of such control impacts the IJV’s performance.
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4. COOPERATION AND JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE
The amount and nature of cooperation between joint 
venture partners have a significant impact on the JV’s 
performance. Janger (1980:5) has noted that "...shared 
equity holdings alone do not make a joint venture in the 
absence of a reason for cooperation".
Although joint ventures may be formed because of 
the need to cooperate, there are numerous opportunities 
for conflicts and disagreements. Such conflicts could 
arise from unilateral decisions made by one partner and 
attempts to enforce them without the other partner’s 
consent. Refusals or delays in providing resources, 
competition between partners, differentiation leading to 
the pursuit of different goals, task interdependence, 
goal blocking, interference with a partner’s goal 
attainment, and power sharing all contribute to conflict 
(Robey, 1982; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977; Schmidt and 
Kochan, 1972; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; 
Van de Ven, Delbeq and Koenig, Jr., 1976). Such 
conflicts could lead to sub-optimization and low 
performance. In addition, abuse of trust and perceived 
inequity (Adams, 1963) also reduce cooperation between 
partners and thereby affect the performance of joint 
ventures (Friedmann, Kolmanoff and Beguin, 1961, 1971;
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Killing, 1383, 1982; Wright, 1977; Burton and Saelens, 
1982) .
Since partners generally exercise influence over 
particular functions they deem important, it may be more 
meaningful to talk about disagreements or conflicts with 
respect to these functional areas rather than about 
overall cooperation. A focus on overall cooperation may 
belie the conflict areas and prevent the development of 
managerially-meaningful insights into those functional 
areas that lead to disagreements or conflict between 
joint venture partners.
The focus of this study will, therefore, be on 
determining the specific areas of conflict or 
disagreements and how these conflicts or disagreements 
impact joint venture performance.
This section has evaluated the behavior of partners 
in structuring the joint venture. The focus was on the 
bargaining between the partners and the outcomes of the 
bargaining— criteria for selecting partner, the level of 
equity ownership attained in the joint venture, the 
functional areas over which control is exercised, and
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cooperation between partners.
The preceeding discussion 
diagramatically in Figure 2.5 below.
presented
FIGURE 2.5 
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Before proceeding to develop the integrated research 
model and hypotheses, it is necessary to examine the 
literature on the measurement of joint venture 
performance. Over the last decade or so, several 
researchers have attempted to measure joint venture 
performance. However, the diversity of definitions and 
measurement criteria used have created some confusion. 
In the next section, therefore, the literature on the 
measurement of joint venture performance is reviewed in 
an effort to determine the most appropriate measure(s) 
to use in this study.
5. MEASURES OF JOINT VENTURE PERFORMANCE
A review of the literature on joint venture 
performance indicates three specific problem areas. 
First, there is no general consensus on the definition 
of joint venture performance. In fact, most researchers 
do not explicitly define joint venture performance, 
preferring to have their definition inferred from the 
measures used. Second, there is no consensus on what 
terminology to use. Some researchers have used the term 
"performance"' (Good, 1972; Dang, 1977) while others have
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used the term "success" (Killing, 1983; Schaan, 1983). 
While the terms could be interchangeable, the lack of 
explicit definitions by some of the researchers makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine if they are 
referring to the same construct. Third is the variety 
of measures used.
Table 2.2 classifies the different measures used 
into three categories or typologies. These are: (1)
studies based on traditional financial measures, like 
return on investment and return on sales ; (2) studies
using survival or continued existence of the joint 
venture as a measure of joint venture performance, and
(3) studies employing a subjective measure of joint 
venture performance.
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Table 2.2 also indicates that, even under the three 
broad classifications, no two researchers used exactly 
the same measures. For example, for the financial
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measure, Good (1972) used six financial, measures in her 
comparison of the performance of U.S. joint ventures in 
Mexico to wholly-owned Mexican firms. These were: (1)
return on investment (ROI), (2) return on equity, (3) 
growth of profits, (4) growth of sales, (5) growth of
total assets, and (6) capital intensity measured as a
ratio of fixed assets to total employment.
Dang (1977) used seven financial measures: (1)
return on equity, (2) growth of sales, (3) return on
assets, (4) return on sales, (5) asset turnover, (6) 
value added and (7) productivity in his examination of 
the relationship between ownership and the performance 
of U.S. joint ventures vis-a-vis wholly-owned 
subsidiaries in the Philippines and Taiwan.
Renforth (1974) used nine financial measures to 
compare the performance of joint ventures between (1) 
U.S.-domiciled MNCs and family-firm partners and (2) 
joint ventures between U.S. firms and non-family 
firm-partners in the Caribbean. His measures were: (1)
return on assets, (2) total sales, (3) cost of goods
sold, (4) net profits, (5) return on assets, (6) total 
assets, (7) total liabilities, (8) total capital and (9) 
working capital.
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None of the above studies found any significant 
differences between the groups of firms studied, in
spite of the varying numbers of financial variables used 
and the different manipulations performed. Good used
raw scores, Dang used deviations from the means of local 
industries, while Renforth used percentage changes in
financial measures over a five-year period.
Two researchers, Franko (1969) and Raveed (1976) 
have used survival as a measure of joint venture 
performance. Killing (1983) is the only one to use the 
subjective evaluation of joint venture general managers.
In a recent study, Schaan (1983) defined joint 
venture success as "the ability of a JV to meet the
expectations of its parents" and operationalized this by 
classifying JVs into the following categories : 
-successful for both parents 
-unsuccessful for both parents
-successful for the MNC parent, unsuccessful for 
the local parent 
-successful for the local parent, unsuccessful 
for the MNC parent.
He concluded that:
-the criteria of success are not always 
explicit;
-JV success is a multidimensional concept
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involving both qualitative (financial) and 
quantitative (non-financial) measures ;
-managers measure JV success by considering a 
combination of criteria over a period of time 
(p. 194).
In a more recent study, Lecraw (1984) used three 
measures of success : (1) the profitability of the
subsidiary, (2) the success of the subsidiary as rated 
by the MNC (l=unsuccessful; 10=very successful), and (3) 
the "corrected" success where the success rating of the 
individual subsidiary was scaled in relation to the 
average success rating of the firms in the sample in the 
same industry in the same country (country and industry 
corrected success) (p. 37). Lecraw explained that the 
MNCs were "asked to rate the success of their investment 
because profitability was not the only component of 
success for the (M)NCs in the sample" (p. 37).
D. CHOICE OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
It is apparent from the foregoing that a clear 
definition of joint venture performance is needed. Such 
a definition must take into account the different 
constituencies served by the IJV. There is an
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"internal" constituency made up of the partners and the 
IJV itself and an "external" constituency made up of 
entities in the organizations* (both IJV and parents) 
external environment. Any performance measures 
selected, therefore, must be based on two main factors : 
(1) parent objectives and (2) industry performance.
For the purposes of this study, a two-part 
definition of joint venture performance was used:
(1) How well the joint venture meets a parent’s 
expectations on criteria the parent considers important.
(2) How the IJV’s performance compares to those of 
its competitors.
Specifically, four measures of IJV performance are 
used in this study. This is in line with the current 
trend of using multidimensional measures of IJV 
performance (Schaan, 1983; Lecraw, 1984; Killing, 1983). 
The measures are:
(1) A financial measure of performance based on: 
(a) return on investment, (b) return on equity, (c) 
growth of sales and (d) market share.
(2) A non-financial measure that evaluates the 
extent to which a parent succeeded in obtaining
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important factors like technology, raw materials, funds 
and access to markets.
(3) A measure of the IJV’s performance relative to 
other firms in its industry, and
(4) A composite measure of performance that 
combines the above three (financial, non-financial, 
industry-related) measures to provide an overall 
assessment of performance.
Table 2.3 presents a list of selected research 
studies discussed in this chapter.
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Chapter III
THE RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
A. THE RESEARCH MODEL
Based on the review of the literature, a research 
model is presented here (Figure 3.1)= The relationships 
depicted in the model form the basis of the research 
..hypotheses to be developed in the next section.
The research model integrates the three sub-models 
developed earlier in the review of the literature 
section (Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3). Figure 2.1
contributes the antecedent factors that led to the 
formation of the IJV. These are government regulations 
and/or attitudes (GRA), firm-specific advantages 
possessed by incoming MNCs (FSA), and missing factors 
(M-Factors). These three factors form the bases of the 
bargaining between the partners and their relative 
bargaining power (RBP).
Figure 2.2 contributes the linkage between the RBP 
of the partners and the outcomes of the bargaining 
between them, namely: criteria for selecting partner
(CSOP), relative equity ownership (RELEO), management
75
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control (MC) and cooperation (CO). Figure 2.3 completes 
the model with the relationship between the four 
bargaining outcomes (CSOP, RELEO, MC and CO) and IJV 
performance.
On the basis of the research model developed, a 
number of research questions may be posed. These 
questions form the bases of the research hypotheses in 
the next section.
These are: (1) To what extent do U.S. government 
regulations and/or attitudes lead to the formation of 
IJVs in the United States? (2) What are the major
contributions of foreign MNCs and U.S. firms to these
IJVs? (3) What is the relationship between relative 
bargaining power (RBP) and IJV performance? (4) What is 
the relationship between RBP and the four bargaining
outcomes, namely: (criteria for selecting partner
(CSOP), relative equity ownership (RELEO), management 
control (MC) and cooperation (CO)? (5) What is the
relationship between the bargaining outcomes and IJV 
performance? And (6) What are the interrelationships 
among the bargaining outcomes (intervening variables) 
and how do these interrelationships affect IJV
performance?
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3. HYPOTHESES
On the basis of the literature reviewed and the 
model developed, three types of hypotheses are proposed; 
(1) a set of hypotheses on the direct relationships 
among variables, (2) hypotheses relating to the 
inter-relationships among the intervening variables, and
(3) hypotheses relating to exploratory research 
questions.
The first hypothesis relates to the relationship 
between the independent variable, relative bargaining 
power (RBP) and the dependent variable, joint venture 
performance (JVP).
Hypothesis 1 :
The more superior one partner’s relative bargaining 
power (RBP), the better the performance of the joint 
venture. That is, one would expect a positive 
relationship between RBP and JVP.
This is in line with research findings that 
indicate that where one partner is dominant joint 
venture performance was higher (Killing, 1983; Schaan^ -
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1983; Beamish and Lane, 1982; Lecraw, 1984).
The next set of hypotheses (2-8) pertain to the 
outcomes of the bargaining between the partners. It is 
reiterated here that relative bargaining power, as 
conceptualized in this study, refers to the resources 
that the partners actually contribute to the joint 
venture. Their bargaining power, therefore, derives 
from these resources.
Hypotheses 2 and 2a test the assertions of 
internalization theory. If the claim that firms engage 
in FDI to prevent the dissipation of their FSA is right, 
then the IJVs they form should be in the industries in 
which they operate at home (horizontal or vertical). 
That is, the investments should represent market 
integrations rather than diversification into other 
industries.
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Hypothesis 2:
The higher the relative bargaining power. the more 
a firm would select partners in the same business as the 
IJV.
High EBP implies the possession of essential 
resources. High RBP also implies a lot of FSA. For the 
MNC with a lot of FSA, the need to internalize the FSA 
would be great. Where the MNC needs to get over 
barriers imposed by GRA and/or market imperfections, the 
investment should be in its own industry. That is, the 
investment should be a market integration, not a 
diversification.
Hypothesis 2a:
The higher the relative bargaining power, the more 
a firm would select partners in its own business.
According to the internalization theory thesis, 
MNCs attempt to prevent the dissipation of their FSAs by 
using them within their own operations in other 
countries. Such danger of dissipation arises because of 
government regulations and other market imperfections
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(Magee, 1977; Dunning, 1977; 1979). But since FSAs are 
specific to firms and their operations (Rugman, Lecraw 
and Booth (1985), the internalization should occur in 
the same industries in which the MNCs have FSAs.
Hypotheses 2b and 2c attempt to determine if 
Tomlinson’s (1970) selection criteria are relevant to 
IJVs in a developed country like the United States.
Hypothesis 2b;
The higher a firm’s relative bargaining power, the 
more it would select partners on the basis of their 
complementary resources. Stated otherwise, there is a 
positive relationship between relative bargaining power 
(RBP) and complementary resources (COMPRES).
High -relative bargaining power implies that the 
firm already has most of the resources needed by the 
IJV. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect that only 
those firms that are in a position to supply the 
additional resources needed would be selected as 
partners.
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Hypothesis 2c:
The higher (or lower) one partner’s relative 
bargaining power, that is, the more assymetric the 
relative bargaining power, the more partners would be 
selected on the basis of favorable past association 
(PASTASSO).
Equal power distribution breeds conflict (Robey,
1982). It is reasonable, therefore, to expect that 
firms joint-venturing after a period of past association 
would have established their power relative to each 
other. Also, firms with unfavorable past association 
would not be expected to collaborate with each other, 
especially where they are free to choose partners. A 
positive relationship is therefore predicted between 
relative bargaining power and past association
Hypothesis 3:
The higher the relative bargaining power (RBP) of a 
firm, the higher the level of relative equity ownership 
(RELEO) it attains in the IJV. That is, there is a 
positive relationship between relative bargaining power
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(RBP) and the level of equity ownership attained 
(RELEO).
Since a firm’s superior bargaining position enables 
it to structure the joint venture to best meet its 
objectives and since equity ownership confers a certain 
degree of control over the joint venture’s operations, a 
higher equity position is reflective of a superior 
bargaining position (Lecraw, 1984; Behrman 1970; 
Friedmann and Kolmanoff, 1961; Friedmann and Beguin, 
1971).
Hypothesis 4;
The higher the relative bargaining power of a 
partner, the greater the level of effective control it 
exercises over the operations of the joint venture. 
That is, there is a positive relationship between 
relative bargaining power and control.
Bargaining power, in the context of this study,- 
relates to the resources a firm actually brings to the 
partnership. The more it contributes, therefore, the 
higher its bargaining power (Killing, 1982; 1983;
Lecraw, 1984; Fayerweather, 1982).
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Hypothesis 5:
The higher the relative bargaining power of one 
partner relative to that of the other, the higher the 
level of cooperation (CO) between them. That is, there 
is a positive relationship between relative bargaining 
power (RBP) and cooperation (CO).
Joint ventures involve the sharing of 
decision-making and pooling of resources by firms that 
may be potential competitors. Each firm may be 
unwilling to cooperate fully for fear of giving away 
company secrets. Where the parties are equally matched, 
cooperation would be low as each party adopts a 
recalcitrant attitude that leads to deadlocks 
(Gullander, 1976). Unequal power distribution enables 
one party to "force" the other to cooperate (Robey, 
1982; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974).
Hypotheses (6-8) relate to the relationship between 
the intervening variables and the dependent variable, 
joint venture performance.
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Hypothesis 6:
The more partners are selected because they are in 
the same business as the joint venture, the higher the 
performance of the joint venture.
Since MNCs try to internalize by bringing their 
FSAs to local operations (Magee, 1976; 1977;Dunning,
1977; 1979), it is reasonable to expect that a joint 
venture’s performance would be higher where the MNC’s 
expertise is in the area of business in which the IJV 
operates.
Hypothesis 6a:
The more partners are selected because they are in 
the same business as the U.S. firm, the higher would be 
the performance of the joint venture.
One of the problems firms engaged in joint ventures 
face is trying to deal with partners that are not 
knowledgeable about their operations. Such partners may 
not appreciate or understand the operational problems 
facing the other partner and the need for certain 
courses of action. IJVs formed between U.S. firms and
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MNCs with FSAs in the same industry should eliminate 
such operational problems, and ceteris paribus, result 
in a more productive joint venture.
Hypothesis 6b:
The more partners are selected because of the 
complementarity of the resources they provide to the 
IJV, the higher would be the IJV’s performance.
One of the major reasons for the formation of joint
ventures is for firms to pool resources. (Killing, 1983;
Gullanger, 1984). It follows, therefore, that a joint
venture would be more successful, ceteris paribus. 
where partners make available resources that the other 
either lacks or does not have enough of.
Hypothesis 6c:
The more favorable the past association between the 
partners, the higher would be the IJV’s performance.
The period before the signing of the formal joint 
venture agreement allows the firms to evaluate each 
other’s suitability as partners and to gain a better
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understanding of each other’s objectives and methods of 
operation (Berg and Friedman, 1980). In essence, any
differences would have been worked out before the 
formation of the joint venture leading to better 
cooperation, and higher performance.
Hypothesis 7:
Where one partner holds a distinct majority (or
minority) equity ownership, the performance of the joint 
venture will be higher.
The relationship between equity ownership and joint 
venture performance has been found to be U-shaped. 
Joint ventures with equally-shared ownership do not
perform as well as those with a distinct majority or 
minority ownership (Beamish and Lane, 1982; Killing,
1983). This is because equity ownership confers power 
to make decisions and/or to veto decisions. Equal 
holdings could lead to deadlocks and periods of
inactivity and conflict (Gullander, 1978).
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Hypothesis 8:
Where control over the operations of the joint 
venture is exercised by only one partner 
performance of the joint venture will be higher.
Balanced power or control leads to conflict which
could be destructive. Such destructive conflict could
negatively affect performance. Therefore, where control 
(or power) is unbalanced, there is less potential for 
conflict (Robey, 1982). Also, dominant-parent joint
ventures perform better than those with equally-shared 
control (Killing, 1983).
Hypothesis 9:
The higher the level of cooperation between 
partners, the higher the IJV’s performance.
International joint ventures are formed because of 
the need of the partners to pool their resources for 
undertakings that either one of them could not (or would 
rather not) handle alone (Killing, 1982; 1983, Beamish, 
1985). The absence of cooperation implies the refusal 
of one or more of the parties to provide the missing
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factors (M-Factors) needed for successful operation. 
Lack of cooperation could, therefore, result in lower 
performance.
The third set of hypotheses (10-13) examines the 
exploratory parameters of this study. These hypotheses 
relate to the interrelationships between and among the 
four intervening variables and how these
inter-relationships affect performance.
Hypothesis 1C:
IJVs with higher complementarity of contributed 
resources (COMPKES) and lower control by both partners, 
that is, higher IJV autonomy, would outperform those 
with lower complementarity of resources contributed by 
partners and higher levels of control by the partners.
With a full complement of the resources it needs to 
operate efficiently and the autonomy to function without 
undue interference from the partners, an IJV could be 
expected to have higher levels of performance.
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Hypothesis 11:
IJVs formed by partners who have had favorable past 
associations and in which partners exercise less 
control, that is, a more autonomous IJV, would 
outperform those with partners who have had unfavorable 
past associations and in which the partners exercise 
higher levels of control.
Unfavorable past association could cause each 
partner to seek to exercise more control over the 
activities of the IJV leading to decreased IJV 
performance.
Hypothesis 12:
IJV’s with higher complementarity of contributed 
resources and high levels of cooperation (CO) would 
outperform those with lower complementarity of 
contributed resources and low levels of cooperation.
Given the right type and quantity of essential 
resources, an IJV could be expected to function
effectively. If such provision of resources is also 
matched by high levels of cooperation between the
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partners, then IJV performance could be expected to be 
higher than where both resources and partner cooperation 
are lacking.
Hypothesis 12a:
IJVs in which partners have had more favorable past 
associations and higher levels of cooperation would 
outperform those in which partners have had unfavorable 
past associations and lower levels of cooperation.
It is reasonable to expect that favorable past 
associations between parties would lead to better 
understanding and cooperation. Furthermore, such 
favorable past associations matched by high cooperation ' 
could be expected to result in higher levels of 
performance.
Hypothesis 13:
IJVs with low levels of partner control, that is, 
high IJV autonomy, and high levels of cooperation would 
outperform those with high levels of partner control, or 
low IJV autonomy, and low levels of cooperation.
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Equal power distribution tends to result in 
conflict as each party tries to exercise its power 
(Killing, 1983).
The next chapter details the research methodology 
used in this study.
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Chapter IV
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter is divided into three sections. The 
first section details the operationalization of
variables. The second section focuses on data
collection methods. The third section describes the
data analysis methods used to test the research 
hypotheses.
A. OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES
This section provides operational definitions of 
the variables and the method of their measurement. The 
variables are classified as independent, intervening and 
dependent.
1. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES.
a. Relative Bargaining Power (RBP)
Relative bargaining power represents the extent to 
which a firm can influence the operations of the joint 
venture. It has been established earlier (in the
93
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review of the literature section) that such influence 
derives from the relative contribution of needed 
resources to the joint venture effort.
The term M-Factors (MF) was used to refer to the 
resources that the foreign MNC supposedly lacks and that 
are contributed to the IJV by the local U.S. partner. 
Firm-specific advantages (FSA) relate to the resources 
the incoming MNC possesses and contributes to IJV.
Fourteen production-related, market-related and 
socio-politico-cultural factors derived from Tomlinson’s 
(1970) study were used to measure the relative 
bargaining power of the partners. The use of resources 
to indicate relative bargaining power follows the work 
of Fagre and Wells (1982) and Lecraw (1984). However, 
the operationalization in this study represents a 
departure from theirs. While they used factors like 
technological intensity, advertising intensity, capital 
intensity, and export intensity that consider the 
POTENTIAL contributions a partner could make to the IJV, 
this study uses the ACTUAL contributions made by 
partners as an indication of their bargaining power. As 
argued earlier, a firm’s right to control a joint 
operation with another firm can only be derived from the 
resources it actually contributes, not the resources it 
possesses but does not make available to the joint
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venture.
The 14 variables are: (1) plants/facilities; (2)
technology; (3) technical personnel: (4) management; (5) 
established brands ; (6) distribution channels ; (7)
research and development (B&D); (8) financial resources; 
(9) raw materials/components; (10) strong market 
position; (11) patents/licenses; (12) capacity to 
provide local identity; (13) government relations ; and 
(14) good overall image. For convenience, the terms MFl 
through MF14 are used to denote the 14 variables in the 
analysis.
The respondents were asked to indicate the relative 
contributions of each of the resources by each partner 
by allocating 100 points between the partners. They 
also rated the importance of each resource on a 7-point 
scale with 7 being "extremely important" and 1 "not at 
all important". For each of the 14 resources, a 
computation of relative power was done using the 
equation:
MFl (RESOURCE) = (CONTRIBUTION OF US FIRM - CONTRIBUTION 
OF PARTNER) X IMPORTANCE OF RESOURCE
Three other variables were added because of their 
obvious impact on bargaining power. These are
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government regulations/attitudes (GRA), country of 
origin of partner (PCOUNTRY), and the relative size of 
the partners (RELSIZE). Government regulations and/or 
attitudes have been established as influencing the
formation of joint ventures between foreign MNCs and 
local firms. It is included here in order to determine 
the extent to which it contributes to the U.S. firm’s
bargaining power. GRA is measured as a composite of
existing government regulations, potential government 
regulations, and tariff barriers. The three measures 
were derived from the 7-point scale questions on the 
motivation of the foreign firms to form joint ventures 
in the United States (Questions 2a, 2b, and 2j in
questionnaire in appendix). GRA was computed by adding 
the scores on each of the three questions and dividing 
the total by three.
The second variable, PCOUNTRY, was included because 
of the distinct characteristics of Japanese and European 
firms that might make them especially desirable 
partners. A dummy variable was used to represent this 
variable with l=European and 3=Japanese. The third 
variable, RELSIZE, was included as an "intimidation 
factor" to capture the extent to which the size of firms 
influenced their power. RELSIZE was computed by 
dividing the total assets of the U.S. firm by the total
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assets of the partner.
2. INTERVENING VARIABLES
a. Relative Equity Ownership (RELEO)— Since the 
assignment of shares is the result of bargaining, the 
allocation is indicative of the outcome of the relative 
bargaining strengths of the partners (LeCraw, 1984). 
The" relative equity level attained by a firm was 
measured by subtracting the percentage equity ownership 
held by the foreign partner from the percentage equity 
ownership held by the U.S. firm. Present equity 
ownership reflects any shifts in the positions of the 
partners over time and also matches the measures of 
performance used for this study.
b. Criteria for Selection of Partner (CSOP)— These 
are the criteria used by the U.S. firms in the selection 
of their partners and are reflective of (a) the 
attributes of partners (b) their perceived 
importance-T-resources they are willing to commit to the 
joint venture.
Four selection criteria are used for this study. 
Two criteria, (1) complementary resources, and (2) past 
association, were taken from Tomlinson's (1970)
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questionnaire. His other criteria are not appropriate 
for this study. Two other selection criteria, (1) the 
relatedness of the partner’s business to that of the 
proposed IJV, and (2) the relatedness of the partners’ 
business, were added. The respondents were asked to 
indicate, on a 7-point scale (question 4 in 
questionnaire), the extent to which the partner was 
selected on the basis of each criterion. Each selection 
criterion was used as a separate measure.
c. Managerial Control (MC)— This is a measure of 
the actual control exercised over the joint venture by 
the local partner (MCU), the foreign partner (MOP) and 
the IJV (MCJ). Nineteen items representing important 
functional areas in an organisation were used. These 
were derived from Tomlinson’s questionnaire, which was 
revised and supplemented to reflect current business 
practice. These items make up question number 22 on the 
questionnaire in the appendix and are listed here for 
immediate reference. They are:
(1) capital expenditure; (2) pricing; (3) dividend 
policy; (4) organisation; (5) product planning ; (6)
production planning ; (7) quality control; (8) marketing 
and sales; (9) purchasing; (10) costing methods; (11) 
budgetary control; (12) accounting procedures ; (13) wage
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and labor policy; (14) selection, promotion and 
compensation of executives; (15) training; (16) 
administration and supervision; (17) reporting 
procedures; (IS) exports and imports; and (19) loan 
funds (financing).
Following the method used by Lecraw (1984), the
respondents were asked to allocate 100 points among the
U.S. firm, the partner and the IJV’s management to 
indicate the relative control they exercised over each
of the 19 functions. In addition, they were asked to
indicate the importance of each function on a 7-point 
scale, with 7 indicating the highest level of 
importance. For each function, each party’s relative 
control was computed by subtracting the level of control 
exercised jointly by the partner and the IJV management 
over a function from the level of control exercised over 
that function by the U.S. firm. The result was then 
weighted by the importance of the function. This 
procedure was repeated for each of the parties.
Rather than derive a composite control score as in 
the Lecraw study, however, all the sub-measures of 
control were used. This is in line with research 
findings that partners exercise control over particular 
functions rather than overall control (Lecraw, 1984, 
Schaan, 1983). A composite score would not indicate the
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particular functions over which each partner exercises 
control.
BHDP9R (best subset analysis) was used to derive 
the elements of control that were significant for each 
of the parties engaged in the joint venture. The 
dependent variable for the analysis was joint venture 
performance.
d. Cooperation (CO)— This is a measure of (1) the 
extent to which there was agreement/disagreement between 
the partners over the 19 functional areas used earlier 
for the control measure; (2) trust; (3) perceived 
equity; and (4) willingness to engage in future 
collaboration with the partner. A total of 23 items was 
used for this scale. The respondents were asked to 
indicate on a 7-point scale how often disagreements had 
occurred over the 19 functional areas. A score of 7 
indicated "never" and 1 "always".
Following the same procedure used for the control 
measure, the EMDP9E program was used to derive the best 
subset of the twenty-three variables that influenced the 
performance of the IJV. A composite measure of 
cooperation would not indicate the particular functions 
over which conflicts and disagreements occurred.
Theoretically, cooperation should be present as
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long as the partners need each other, and should 
decrease as such need declines.
An important point needs to be made here with 
respect to correlation among some of the nineteen
control variables (and some of the twenty-three
cooperation variables) used in the analysis.
Even though correlation analysis (see appendix) 
indicates that some of these variables are related, in a 
conceptual or theoretical sense they are distinct 
dimensions that are independent of each other. For 
example, production and production planning are two 
functions used in this study. While the two may seem to 
be related, control over the two functions may be split 
between the partners and the IJV management. One 
partner may have control over production planning while 
the IJV management has control over production. 
Therefore, eliminating either one of them on 
methodological grounds because they happen to be 
correlated would be inappropriate since theoretically, 
they are independent dimensions. That is, a data-driven 
correlation that is significant only reflects a
coincidental inter-relation among these variables in
real organizations and does not imply that these two 
dimensions are the same and hence interchangeable.
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Further, the use of the full set of variables would 
enable a comparison of significant control variables 
across the U.S. firm, the foreign partner and the IJV 
management. Thus, normative guidelines that may emerge 
would then be theory-driven and not data-driven 
(McGrath, 1964).
3. DEPENDENT VARIABLE
IJV Performance— In line with the conclusions drawn 
from the review of the literature and the proposed 
definition of joint venture performance, four measures 
of performance are used for this study.
The use of multiple measures of performance in this 
study is in line with research findings that different 
kinds of measures (financial, non-financial, objective 
and subjective, etc.) are used to evaluate the 
performance of joint ventures (Schaan, 1983). It is 
also in keeping with current research practice (Killing, 
1983; Lecraw, 1984).
The four measures of performance used were derived 
by asking the U..S. firms to indicate:
(1) How well the joint venture met its expectations 
on criteria the parent considers important. These 
expectations fall into two categories: financial
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(JVPFIN) and non-financial (JVPNOFIN). Each category 
was measured separately.
(2) How well the joint venture has performed 
relative to competitors in its industry (JVPIND). This 
is similar to Lecraw*s (1984) "country and industry 
corrected success" although no country correction was 
made in this study.
The fourth measure was an overall measure of 
performance (IJVP). It was derived by taking the 
average of the three measures of performance (JVPFIN, 
JVPNOFIN, and JVPIND).
B. DATA COLLECTION
This section describes the sample, questionnaire 
and data analysis techniques used for this study.
1. THE POPULATION AND SAMPLE
The published listings of FDI in the United States 
(see list below) contain information gathered from 
public sources only. This means that unless the 
formation of an IJV is reported in the popular press, 
its existence may not be generally known. The size of
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the target population is, therefore, unknown. However, 
several sources were available for the development of a 
list of U.S. firms engaged in IJVs in the United States 
with foreign firms.
2. DATABASE DEVELOPMENT
A number of different sources were used for this 
purpose. These are:
1. Lists generously provided by the Conference
2. Mergers & Acquisitions.
3. Yearbook On Corporate Mergers, Joint 
Ventures and Corporate Policy.
4. FTC listings of foreign investments in 
the United States.
5. Department of Commerce— International 
Trade Administration.
Although there were several overlaps, no two 
sources provided exactly the same listings. Out of the 
several sources, a list of 228 IJVs in the manufacturing 
sector (SIC 20-39) was developed. These U.S. firms had 
partners from Europe and Japan. Addresses for the U.S.
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partners in these IJVs were obtained from Standard & 
Poor’s Register of Corporations and Executives, and The 
Directory of Corporate Affiliations.
The selection of joint venture partners from two 
different continents with entirely different cultural 
orientations— Europe and Asia— was expected to provide 
insights into the different patterns and strategies used 
by different parents from these two continents.
In an effort to (1) increase the number of IJVs in 
the study, and (2) check the accuracy and completeness 
of the sources used to develop the JV list, a separate 
list was compiled using the firms in the Fortune 500 
list. From the FORTUNE 500 list, 210 firms that had not 
been listed in any of the sources indicated above as 
having IJVs in the United States were selected.
3. QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTRATION
Ideally, data should be collected first hand 
through personal interviews with all the parties to a 
joint venture. This would, however, necessitate 
travelling to several European countries, Japan and all 
over the continental United States. Such a procedure is 
not feasible due to the costs and time involved. This 
limitation may explain the use of secondary published
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data by some researchers on joint ventures like Duncan 
(1980) and Crick (1981), and the small sample sizes in 
studies that have utilized personal interviews (Good, 
1972; Schaan 1983; Dang 1977).
While personal interviews provide needed 
information, the small sample sizes preclude any 
meaningful statistical analysis. On the other hand, use 
of secondary published data severely limits the 
generali zabi1ity of the studies since the true 
motivations of partners cannot be determined from ex 
post facto statistics. It was therefore decided to use 
a mail questionnaire (Appendix 1) to elicit the required 
information. The questionnaire is an adaptation of the 
questionnaire developed by Tomlinson (1970). The 
questionnaires were mailed only to the U.S. partners.
In October 1985, a letter and a form were mailed to 
439 CEOs (229 in the JV list and 210 Fortune 500) 
soliciting their help with the study. They were also 
asked to list on the forms: (1) the IJVs they were
involved with in the United States and (2) the 
executive(s) to whom the questionnaire(s) should be sent 
for completion. As the forms were returned, 
questionnaires with cover letters (see appendix) were 
mailed to the indicated executives. Follow-up phone 
calls were made to determine if the questionnaires had
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been received and to encourage early completion and 
return. Table 5.1 below summarizes the sequence of 
events.
By December 15, 1985, 53 of the Fortune 500 list 
had returned their forms. Forty-four indicated they had 
no IJVs in the United States. Seven refused to 
participate in the study. Only one of the returns from 
this group was useable (1/53=.018 percent). Of the JV 
list firms, 65 had returned their forms. Thirty 
indicated they had no IJVs in the United States. Ten 
refused to participate. Two listed eight IJVs all 
located outside the United States. Twenty-five agreed 
to participate and had a total of twenty-eight IJVs in 
the United States. Twenty of the questionnaires 
returned by this group were usable.
TABLE 4.1
PATTERN OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRES




30 10 25 65 28 20
Second 29 5 14 48 20 19
TOTALS 59 15 39 113 48 39
F 500 (210) 
First 44 7 2 53 2 1
GRAND
TOTALS 103 22 29 156 50 40
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For the second mass mailing on January 6, 1986, it 
was decided to send follow-up letters (see appendix) 
only to the 164 CEOs on the JV list that had not earlier 
responded. Twenty-nine indicated they had no IJVs in 
the United States. Five refused to participate. 
Fourteen agreed to participate and had a total of 20 
IJVs. Again, the mailing of the questionnaires was 
followed by numerous phone calls urging early completion 
and return of the questionnaire. Forty of the fifty 
questionnaires returned were usable.
The fact that 59 firms on the compiled list 
indicated they had no IJVs may be explained by a number 
of factors :
t Some of the sources used did not indicate the 
location of some of the IJVs.
* Some of the listed IJVs turned out to be 
wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS) and were never IJVs.
* A number of the IJVs had been bought by one 
partner, sold or dissolved.
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C. DATA ANALYSIS
The research model incorporates several dependence 
relationships. The technique most suited to this is 
Multiple Regression Analysis (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & 
Qrablowski, 1979). Multiple regression analysis is a 
statistical technique that can be used to predict a 
single dependent variable from the knowledge of two or 
more independent variables. This was used to estimate 
the direct causal relationships between variables.
The BMDP9R statistical package was used to 
determine the best subset of variables for the control 
and cooperation variables that explain joint venture 
performance. Two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
used to estimate the combined effects of the mediating 
variables on joint venture performance. In the interest 
of parsimony, only the overall measure of joint venture 
performance (IJVP) was used for the ANOVAs. A detailed 
presentation of the data analysis procedures is given in 
the next chapter along with the results.
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Chapter V
RESEARCH RESULTS: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
This chapter presents the results of the study and the 
interpretations derived from the analysis. First, the 
findings on the motivations for setting up joint ventures 
in the United States are examined. Next, the tests of 
hypotheses are presented.
A. MOTIVATIONS FOR JOINT VENTURE
Table 5.1 indicates that business factors were ranked 
as the top three motivations for European and Japanese MNCs 
setting up IJVs in the United States. Specifically, the 
need to gain access into U.S. markets was ranked first 
overall with a mean of 6.24. The need to create a local 
image was ranked second with a mean of 5.08. The 
opportunity to diversify was ranked third with a mean of 
4.89.
The table also indicates that U.S. government 
regulations and attitudes (GRA) do impact the decisions of 
foreign MNCs to engage in IJVs in the United States. This 
is indicated by the moderately high means {3.42 and 3.39)
110
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and rankings (4th and 5th, respectively) of existing U.S. 
government regulations and/or attitudes (GRA) and potential 
GRA. Additionally, the need to obtain technology, attain 
scale economies and match competitors were also moderately 
important motivators.
MEANS AND RANKINGS OF MOTIVATION FOR JOINT VENTURE 
VARIABLES FOR FOREIGN PARTNERS
OVERALL




1. EXISTING U.S. GRA 3.42 1.75 42. POTENTIAL GRA 3.39 2.08 53. GOVT. INCENTIVES 2.09 1.32 104. TARIFF BARRIERS 2.10 1.63 9
BUSINESS FACTORS 
1. LOCAL IMAGE 5.08 1.40 2
2. NEW MARKETS 6.24 .82 1
3. PROTECT MARKET 2.71 1.65 84. MATCH COMPETITORS 3.00 1.74 75. RAW MATERIALS 2.00 1.33 116 . DIVERSIFICATION 4.89 2.06 3
7. TRANSPORTATION 2.10 1.58 98 . FOREIGN EXCHANGE 2.00 1.63 119. OBTAIN TECHNOLOGY 3.32 2.06 610. SCALE ECONOMIES 3.32 2.00 6
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Overall, the business factors were significantly more 
important motivators than the government factors. The "t" 
test of differences between the two groups was. 12.64 at 39 
(n-1) degrees of freedom.
These findings provide support for earlier findings by 
Beamish (1985) and Killing (1983) on the relative 
importance of business and government factors in the 
motivations for setting up IJVs in the developed (DCs) and 
lesser developed countries (LDCs). The findings also 
support earlier findings and assertions made by some 
researchers (Webley, 1974; Negandhi and Baliga, 1980; 
Franko, 1971) that foreign MNCs were being forced to 
establish IJVs in the United States because of U.S. 
government regulations and/or attitudes. These findings
imply that business factors, or the need for resources, are 
a mere powerful influence in the decision of foreign firms 
to set up joint ventures with local U.S. firms than 
governmental factors. In the LDCs, however, governmental 
factors constitute the major motivations for the formation 
of IJVs (La Palorobara and Blank, 1979; Friedmann and 
Kolmanoff, 1961; Friedmann and Beguin, 1971; Tomlinson, 
1970) .
Tests were also conducted to determine if there were 
differences in the impacts of the motivational variables on 
European and Japanese firms. The "t" tests presented in
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Table 5.2 indicate that the motivational variables impact 
European and Japanese firms differently. Specifically, 
Japanese firms are more likely to have IJVs in the United 
States as a result of existing and potential governmental 
regulations than are European firms. The "t" tests for 
existing GRA and potential GRA are significant at 
alpha=G.10.
Furthermore, Japanese firms have a greater need to 
develop a local image, or to be perceived as "locals", than 
European firms. The "t" test for this factor was 
significant at alpha=0.05. This finding may be due to the 
similarity between the cultures of European countries and 
the United States. Japanese culture is much more different 
than the culture of the United States and European 
countries. Also, in the United States, there is more 
protectionist sentiment against the Japanese.
Lastly, Japanese firms are influenced more by 
fluctuations in foreign exchange rates than European firms. 
While the explanation for this finding is not readily 
apparent, the difference may be due to the financial 
strategies used by European and Japanese firms. Perhaps 
the European firms keep their funds in the United States 
while the Japanese repatriate them either to Japan or to 
other countries.
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"T" TESTS OF MOTIVATION FOR JOINT VENTURE VARIABLES FOR 
EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE FIRMS
MOTIVATION FOR IJV
GOVERNMENT FACTORS
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Generally, the above findings are in line with current 
American attitudes towards the Japanese as indicated by 
factors like trade embargoes on Japanese cars and 
persistent charges of dumping goods in the United States.
Table 5.3 shows that access to the technology 
possessed by foreign firms is the single most important
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motivation for U.S. firms that engage in IJVs with foreign 
firms in the United States. The table shows that the need 
for technology has the highest mean (5.84). This was 
followed by the need to attain market growth through 
increased scope of operations with a mean of 4.92 and the 
need to save time by pooling resources with a mean of 3.95.
This finding, when taken with the earlier finding that 
access to the U.S. market and a local image are the major 
motivations for Japanese and European firms, provides 
empirical support for the assertion by Rugman, Lecraw and 
Booth (1985) that MNCs generally have FSA in technology 
while local firms contribute an understanding of the local 
environment.
This implies that foreign MNCs provide local firms 
access to their technology in exchange for access into U.S. 
markets, a local image, and the opportunity to diversify. 
This, clearly, is contrary to the position taken by foreign 
direct investment theorists who recommend the preservation 
of the firm-specific advantages possessed by MNCs through 
internalization, preferably through wholly-owned 
subsidiaries (Magee, 1976; 1977; Dunning, 1977; 1979).
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TABLE 5.3
MEANS AND RANKINGS OF MOTIVATION FOR JOINT VENTURE 














































Since IJVs do present opportunités for the dissipation 
of MNCs FSA, perhaps an area for future research should be 
the determination of strategies for preventing or slowing 
down the rate of dissipation of firm-specific advantages in 
IJVs.
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B. TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
Hypothesis 1 :
The more superior one partner’s relative bargaining 
power (EBP), the better the performance of the joint 
venture. That is, one would expect a positive relationship 
between EBP and JVP.
Before running the multiple regressions with the 
components of EBP (Tables 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6), the
correlation matrix (see appendix) was first examined. MF13 
was dropped because it correlated highly with other 
variables.
Table 5.4 shows that the r-squares for the four 
measures of performance range from .35 to .53. The overall 
F-ratio for the regression models are not statistically 
significant. This non-significance could imply that IJV 
performance is a function of variables other than the 
components of EBP examined here. The non-significance of 
the F-ratios could also be due to the small sample size (40 
IJVs) used in this study. On the basis of the 
non-significant F-ratios, hypothesis 3 was not supported.
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TABLE 5.4
REGRESSION ANALYSIS— COMPONENTS OF RELATIVE BARGAINNING 
POWER VS THE MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE
JVPFIN JVPNOFIN JVPIND IJVP
R-SQUARED .38 .35 .53 .39
OVERALL F-RATIO .82 .72 1.46 .84
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .65 .74 .20 .63
GRA -0.308 -0.305 0.001 -0.245PCOUNTRY -0.254 -0.197 -0.107 -0.209RELSIZE -0.192 -0.002 -0.281 -0.152MFl-PLANT -0.093 -0.059 -0.315 -0.142MF2-TECHNOLOGY -0.022 -0.137 0.175 -0.017MF3-TECH. PERS. -0.425 -0.373 -0.239 -0.382MF4-MGT. 0.256 0.089 0.241 0.206MF5-BRANDS -0.505 -0.577 -0.204 -0.485MF6-DISTRIBUTION 0.121 0.115 0.373 0.191MF7-R&D 0.422 0.465 0.658*** 0.524*MF8-FINANCE 0.207 0.327 -0.253 0.147MF9-RAW MATERIALS 0.606** 0.621 0.116 0.521*MFIO-MKT. POSITION 0.016 0.022 0.064 0.032MF11-PATENTS 0.129 0.113 0.080 0.118MF12-LOCAL ID. -0.215 -0.272 0.238 -0.133MF14-GOOD IMAGE -0.065 -0.068 -0.324 -0.137
Note: 1. The coefficients are standardized betas.





Table 5.5 summarizes the empirical results of the
tests of hypotheses 4 through 4c. To maintain proper
focus, it is reiterated that relative bargaining power, as 
conceptualised in this study, relates mainly to the
resources (MFl to MF14 in Table 5.5) that the partners are
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willing to contribute to the IJV. The more a firm 
contributes, therefore, the higher its relative bargaining
TABLE 5.5
REGRESSION SUMMARY— RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER VS CRITERIA 
FOR SELECTING PARTNERS
JVBUS URBUS COMPRES PASTASSO
R-SQUARED .89 .67 .45 .50
OVERALL F-RATIO 3.77 1.85 3.47 2.27
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .03 .00 .09 .00
GRA 0.369**** 0.158 0.271 -0.230
PCOUTRY 0.117*** 0.130 0.290 -0.002
RELSIZE -0.320*** -0.311 -0.232 0.096
MFl-PLANT 0.372*** 0.230 0.023 0.233
MF2-TECHNOLOGY 0.605*** 0.129 0.744* 0.208
MF3-TECH. PERS. -0.516*** -0.253 -0.403 -0.449
MF4-MANAGEMENT -0.672**** 0.571*** 0.649** -0.173
MF5-BRANDS 0.255 0.104 0.118 -0.541
MF6-DISTRIBUTI0N 0.422** -0.625*** 0.044 -0.110
MF7-R&D 0.351** -0.190 0.164 0.126
MF8-FINANCE -0.034 -0.107 0.028 0.838*
MF9-RAW MATERIALS -0.077 0.440** -0.150 0.359
MFIO-MKT. POSITION 0.058 0.524** 0.771** 0.102
MF11-PATENTS -0.370*** -0.361 -0.404 0.077
MF12-LOCAL ID. 0.552**** -0.069 0.236 -0.290
MF14-GOOD IMAGE -0.218 0.016 -0.474 0.072





* — . 10
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Hypothesis 2:
The higher the relative bargaining power, the more a 
firm would select a partner that is in the same business as 
the IJV.
This hypothesis was supported (Table 5.5). The
significant regression coefficients indicate that RBP 
adequately accounts for the selection of partners in the 
IJV* s business. This provides empirical support for 
internalization theory which asserts that MNCs internalize 
their FSA for use in similar industries or operations in
other countries (Magee, 1976; 1977; Dunning, 1977; 1979).
That is, high RBP or firm-specific advantages, leads to the 
need to internalize those FSA in the same industry.
An examination of the signs of the beta coefficients 
in Table 5.5 indicates the particular resources that 
account for the selection of a partner in the IJV’s 
business. The U.S. firm supplies (1) plant, (2)
technology, (3) distribution channels, (4) R&D and (5) 
local identity. The foreign partner supplies (1) technical 
personnel, (2) management and (3) patents.
While on the surface this may appear coincidental, a 
closer look indicates that the U.S. firm provides the
plant, the technology (hardware) and the research 
facilities within which the foreign partner’s patents are
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used by its technical personnel and management. Obviously, 
such a combination of resources provides opportunities for 
the U.S. firm to absorb the foreign partner’s technical 
knowhow.
The most important resource supplied by the U.S. firm 
is local identity (significant at alpha=0.001 level). 
Local image was also a very important motivational factor 
(significant at alpha=0.0005, Table 5.1) in the decision of 
foreign firms to set up IJVs in the United Staates. These 
findings here also provide support for the assertion by 
Rugman, et al. (1985) that MNCs provide technology while 
their local partners provide an understanding of the local 
environment.
Hypothesis 2a:
The higher the relative bargaining power, the more a 
firm would select a partner in its own business.
This hypothesis was supported (Table 5.5). The 
findings here are also interesting. First, there is a 
smaller number of resources involved. Second, the pattern 
is completely different from that noted for selection of 
partner in the same business as the IJV. The US firm 
supplies (1) management (MF4), (2) raw materials (MF9) and
(3) a strong market position (MF1Û). The foreign partner
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provides access into foreign markets (MF6).
This and the earlier finding would indicate that two 
separate strategies are involved in IJVs in the United 
States. U.S. firms and their foreign partners appear to be 
careful where both of them are in the same business. In 
such cases, the range of resources provided was limited. 
The U.S. firm provided the management, the raw materials 
and a strong market position. The partner provided access 
into its distribution channels outside the United States. 
It is not clear, however, if such access was into the 
partner’s home country market.
Hypothesis 2b:
The higher a firm’s relative bargaining power (RBP), 
the more it is able to select partners on the basis of 
their complementary resources (COMPRES). Stated otherwise, 
there is a positive relationship between RBP and COMPRES.
This hypothesis was supported (Table 5.5). The 
significant variables were (1) technology (MF2) at 
alpha=0.10, (2) management (MF4) at alpha=0.05, and (3) 
local markets (MFIO) at alpha=0.05. The beta coefficients 
for all these variables are positive indicating a positive 
relationship between RBP and COMPRES. This implies that 
the more the U.S. firms can supply (1) technology, (2)
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management, and (3) access to local markets, the more they 
would select partners with resources complementary to their
Hypothesis 2c:
Relative bargaining power is significantly related to 
the favorableness of the past association between the 
partners.
This hypothesis was supported. Table 5.5 above shows 
that finance (MF8) has a positive sign and is significant 
at alpha=0.10. This implies that U.S. firms would select 
partners on the basis of the favorableness of their past 
association when the U.S. firm supplies the financing for 
the IJV project.
Interestingly, GRA, RELSIZE and PCOUNTRY were 
significant for only the selection of a partner in the same 
business as the IJV. GRA and PCOUNTRY were positive and 
significant at alpha=0.001 and 0.01 repectively. RELSIZE 
was significant at the alpha=0.01 but had a negative sign. 
These results imply that foreign MNCs use specific 
strategies for entering the U.S. market. The findings 
support internalization theory in that when GRA was high, 
MNCs internalized their FSA in IJVs in their own industry 
(market integration). Their country-attractiveness and 
size gave them superior bargaining power in these IJVs.
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Hypothesis 3:
The higher the bargaining power of a firm, the higher 
the level of relative equity ownership (RELEO) it attains 
in the IJV.
TABLE 5.6
REGRESSION SUMMARY— RELATIVE BARGAINING POWER VS EQUITY 
OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND COOPERATION
RELEO MCU MCP CO
R-SQUARED .98 .54 .40 .48
OVERALL F-RATIO 120.47 1.55 .88 1.68
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL .00 .17 .59 .13
GRA -0.045 0.051 0.217 -0.261
PCOUTRY -0.025 0.100 0.334 0.148
RELSIZE 0.993*** 0.155 0.167 0.252
MFl-PLANT 0.014 -0.231 0.363 -0.150
MF2-TECHN0L0GY 0.207 -0.378 0.338 0.157
MF3-TECH. PEES. 0.006 0.319 0.027 -0.385
MF4-MANAGEMENT -0.020 -0.106 -0.417 0.590**
MF5-BRANDS -0.020 0.275 0.489 0.014
MF6-DISTRIBUTI0N -0.055 -0.408 0.076 -0.330
MF7-R&D 0.013 -0.747*** -0.232 -0.057
MF8-FINANCE 0.017 0.134 -0.399 0.415
MF9-RAW MATERIALS 0.011 -0.254 -0.262 -0.114
MFIO-MKT. POSITION 0.004 0.165 -0.080 0.180
MFl1-PATENTS 0.021 -0.110 -0.580* -0.205
MF12-LOCAL ID. -0.004 -0.558** -0.069 -0.174
MF14-GOOD IMAGE -0.005 0.143 0.034 -0.165
Note: The coefficients are standardized betas.
Significance 
** * — .01 
** - .05
* - .10
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This hypothesis was supported (Table 5.6). RELSIZE 
was significant at the 0.01 level. The positive beta 
coefficient leads tc the conclusion that higher bargaining 
power results in a higher level of equity ownership. It 
also indicates that large size is significantly and 
positively related to the level of equity ownership 
attained. This finding supports earlier findings by Fagre 
and Wells (1982) and Lecraw (1984).
Hypothesis 4:
The higher the relative bargaining power of the firm, 
the greater the level of effective control it exercises 
over the operations of the joint venture.
This hypothesis was not supported for both the U.S. 
firms and their foreign partners (Table 5.6). The overall 
F-ratio of 1.55 was only significant at the 0.17 level. 
This implies that the relationship between RBP and the 
control actually exercised by partners over the IJV is not 
a simple one. Parent control (MCU/MCP), in the context of 
this study, refers to the ACTUAL control exercised by the 
partners, not the POTENTIAL control they could exercise. 
The resources brought forth to the IJV determine the extent 
of potential control enjoyed by the contributor. However, 
the actual control exercised may be a function of several 
other variables. Also, the partner with the potential
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control may not actually exercise the control (Wright, 
(1977) .
This result supports Schaan’s (1983) findings on 
control. Control was exercised through other means such as 
organizational processes— (1) visits, (2) reports, (3) 
influence over the partner, (4) use of negative control 
(preventing decisions from being implemented).
Hypothesis 5:
The higher the relative bargaining power of one 
partner relative to that of the other partner, the higher 
the level of cooperation between them. That is, there is a 
positive relationship between relative bargaining power and 
cooperation.
As with control, the relationship between RBP and 
cooperation appears not to be a simple one (Table 5.6). 
The regression was only significant at the 0.13 level. 
Perhaps the power and conflict concept of "power over" is 
not applicable in the case of IJVs. That is, mere resource ' 
contributions would not ensure high levels of cooperation 
in IJVs.
This is especially the case where cooperation implies 
lack of disagreements over specific functions of the IJV. 
The pursuit of "sub unit" goals, goal blocking and 
competition all provide opportunities for conflict and
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disagreements (Robey, 1982: Salâncik and Pfeffer, 1S77).
Hjrpothesis 6-9 relate to the four intervening variables and 
their impact on IJV performance.
Hypothesis 6:
The greater the relatedness of the partner’s business 
to that of the joint venture, the greater would be the 
joint venture’s performance.
This hypothesis was not supported (Table 5.7). This 
implies that the same level of joint venture performance is 
achievable in joint ventures that are either related or 
unrelated to the partner’s business.
Hyppothesis 6a:
The greater the similarity of the businesses of the 
partners, the greater would be the joint venture’s 
performance.
This hypothesis was supported across all the four 
different measures of performance used in this study 
(Table 5.7). However, the beta coefficients are negative, 
indicating that there is an inverse relationship between 
the similarity of the partners’ businesses and joint 
venture performance. This would imply that joint ventures
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with partners in different industries/businesses would 
achieve higher levels of performance. This, perhaps, is 
due to the larger base of resources that parents in 
different industries would be able to bring to bear on the 
joint venture. Also, parents in the same business are 
still competitors in spite of their collaborating in the 
joint venture. The need to preserve their firm-specific 
advantages and future competitiveness could, therefore, 
hamper the performance of the joint venture.
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* significant at the .10 level.
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Hypothesis 6b:
The more the partners contribute complementary resources to 
the joint venture, the higher would be the joint venture’s 
performance.
This hypothesis is supported for only the 
non-financial measure (JVPNOFIN) of performance (Table 
5.7). This finding supports one of the basic premises for 
setting up joint ventures— the desire to acquire missing 
factors from the partner (Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1985).
Hypothesis 6c:
The more favorable the past association between the 
partners, the higher would be the joint venture’s 
perf ormance.
This hypothesis is not supported for any of the four 
performance measures (Table 5.7). This finding parallels 
Tomlinson’s (1970:36) finding that even where partners had 
been selected on the basis of favorable past association, 
that was a less important selection factor than the 
resource contributions the partners were able to make to 
the joint venture. This implies that past history, by 
itself, is not a significant predictor of future IJV 
performance. A normative guideline that emerges from this
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finding is that joint venture partner selection must be 
based on the merits and prospects of the venture itself and 
not on past association or history with partners.
Hypothesis 7:
Where one partner holds a distinct majority (or 
minority) equity ownership, the performance of the joint 
venture will be higher.
As Table 5.7 indicates, this hypothesis is not 
supported for any of the four performance measures. This 
implies that there is no relationship between the level of 
equity ownership attained and the joint venture’s 
performance. This finding is contrary to those of Killing 
(1383), and Beamish and Lane (1S82) who found a "U-shaped" 
relationship between equity ownership and performance. 
This difference in findings may be due to the focus of the 
studies. This study focuses on U.S.-based IJVs between U.S. 
firms and partners from Europe and Japan. Additionally, 
the selection was limited to those in the manufacturing 
sector. The Killing study used thirty-four joint ventures 
in DCs and two in LDCs while the Beamish and Lane study 
focused on joint ventures in LDCs.
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Hypothesis 8:
Where control over a particular function or operation 
of the joint venture is exercised by only the U.S. firm, 
the partner, or the joint venture’s management, the joint 
venture’s performance would be higher. That is, the 
elements of control that significantly determine joint 
venture performance would vary for the U.S. firm, the 
partner and the joint venture’s management.
The significant R-squares (with p-values ranging from
0.000 to 0.07) indicate that this hypothesis was supported 
(Tables 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10). That is, a distinct allocation 
of control with respect to the joint venture’s operations 
enhances performance. This is in line with Schaan’s (1983) 
finding that partners exercised control within specific 
contexts or decisions rather than one partner exercising 
overall control. A more detailed examination of the 
results reveals important differences in the elements of 
control that are significant for the U.S. firm, the partner 
and the joint venture’s management. The specific elements 
of control that are important for each party are described
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SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF CONTROL FOR U.S. FIRM
For the U.S. firm, the significant control factors 
that determine performance are (1) pricing, (2) 
organization, (3) accounting procedures, and (4) exports 
and imports. All these four factors are significant across 
all four measures of performance. However, the signs of 
the beta coefficients indicate an inverse relationship for 
pricing and organization, and a positive relationship for 
accounting procedures and exports and imports. This 
implies that the joint venture’s performance would improve 
if the U.S. firm exercises LESS control over the pricing 
and organizing functions of the joint venture and exercises 
MORE control over the accounting procedures and exports and 
imports.
Furthermore, for each measure of performance, other 
elements of control were found to be significant. For 
example, for the financial measure of performance (JVPFIN), 
(1) product planning and (2) purchasing were significant. 
The signs of the beta coefficients indicate a positive 
relationship for product planning and an inverse 
relationship for purchasing. For the non-financial measure 
of performance (JVPNOFIN), control over (1) administration 
and (2) supervision were significant with the signs of the 
beta coefficients indicating inverse relationships for
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For both the industry level (JVPIND) and overall 
(IJVP) measures of performance, additional significant 
elements are (1) production planning, (2) costing methods, 
and (3) wage and labor policy. The signs of the beta 
coefficients indicate positive relationships for production 
planning _id an inverse relationship for costing methods 
and wage and labor policy.
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TABLE 5.8
SOHMâB? TiBLE-CONTBOL VS PEBFOBHAHCE FOB U.S
PEBFOBHANCE HEASUBE
JVPFIN JVPNOFIN JVPIND IJVP
ÜCPBICE -0.455» -0.464» -0.400» -0.519»
(-1.96) (-2.00) (-2.36) (-2.40)
ÜCDIVID -0.257
(-0.257)
UCOBG -0.782»* -0.622* -0.738**
(-2.58) (-1.84) (-2.55) (-2.33)
UCPBOD 0.605*» 0.331 0.360
( 2.60) ( 1.43) ( 1.32)
ÜCPPLAN 1.011**» 0.573*





UCACCT 0.557*** 0.522*** 0.855**** 0.773****





ÜCBXIH 0.752** 0.878*** 1.117**** 1.069***
( 2.40) I 2.56) ( 4.21) ( 3.20)
B-SQUABE .34 .33 .53 .43
P-VALÜE .024 .051 .000 .015
Note: T-values in parentheses.
«t: significant at .001 
tt» significant at .01 
tt significant at .05 
» significant at .10
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SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF CONTROL FOR PARTNER
For the partner, the significant control factors are
(1) pricing, (2) budgetary control, and (3) training. All
these three factors are significant across all four
measures of performance. However, the beta coefficients 
indicate a positive relationship for budgetary control and 
inverse relationships for pricing and training. That is, 
joint venture performance would improve if the partner 
exercises LESS control over the pricing and training 
functions of the joint venture and MORE control over the 
budgeting function. For the industry level measure of 
performance (JVPIND), additional control factors were 
significant. These are (1) purchasing, (2) wage and labor 
policy, (3) administration and supervision, and (4)
reporting procedures. The signs of the beta coefficients 
show a positive relationship for purchasing, wage and labor 
policy, and reporting procedures and an inverse 
relationship for administration and supervision.
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TABLE 5.9
EBGBBSSIOS SUSSAS! TASLB-COSTEOL VS PBEFOEKAHCB FOR FOEBIGN PAETNBE 
PBEFOEHAKCB HEASUEB
JVPFIN JVPNOFIN JVPIND IJVP
PCCAP -0.186
(-1.32)
PCPEICB -0.373m -0.398» -0.358» -0.444»»»





PCPUECH 0.288 0.350» 0.242
( 1.39) ( 2.17) ( 1.54)
PCCOSTS -0.320
(-1.451
PCBÜDGBT 0 .5 9i m 0.535»»» 0.915»»»» 0.504»»»





PCTBAIN -0.557»» -0.587»»» -0.802»»» 0.559»»»»





E'SQUAEB .42 .28 .45 .38
P-VALUB .001 .019 .014 .005
Note: T'values in parentheses.
»«» significant at .001 
ttt significant at .01 
tt significant at .05 
t significant at .10
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SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS OF CONTROL FOR JOINT VENTURE 
MANAGEMENT
For the joint venture's management, the significant 
control elements that determine performance are (1) pricing 
and (2) selection, promotion and compensation of 
executives. These control factors are significant across 
all the four measures of performance. The signs of the 
beta coefficients indicate that there is a positive 
relationship between performance and both pricing and the 
selection, promotion and compensation of executives. That 
is, the joint venture's performance would improve if the 
joint venture's management exercises control over these two 
functions.
For the financial measure of performance (JVPFIN), 
five other control elements are significant. These are (1) 
product planning, (2) production planning, (3) quality 
control, (4) reporting procedures, and (5) exports and 
imports. The signs of the beta coefficients indicate that 
the joint venture’s performance would improve if joint 
venture management exercises MORE control over product 
planning, reporting procedures and exports and imports and 
LESS control over production planning and quality control. 
For the non-performance measure (JVPNOFIN), purchasing was 
significant with an inverse relationship to performance.
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TABLE 5.10
BBGBESSION SUHHABY TABLE--COHTBOL VS PEBFOBHANCE FOB JOINT VSNTOBS HANAGEHENT
PEBFOBHANCE HEASUBE
JVPFIN JVPNOFIN JVPIND IJVP
JCCAP 0.255 0.198 0.217
( 1.39) ( 1.23) ( 1.43)
JCPBICB 0 .8 04 m 0.483» 0.468»»» 0.457»













JCEIEC 0.5 52 m 0.347» 0.534»»»» 0.422»







B-SQUABE .44 .22 .34 .30
P-VALUB .021 .070 .001 .012
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Collectively, the above findings indicate two 
important features about the roles of the parties involved 
in joint ventures. First, the elements of control that are 
significant tend to differ for each party. Second, 
pricing— the element of control that is significant for all 
three parties— reveals an important allocation of 
responsibility. That is, to improve the joint venture’s 
performance, control over the pricing function should be 
exercised MORE by joint venture management and LESS by the 
U.S. firm and the partner. Table 5.11 summarizes the 
signficant control elements for the three parties and the 
signs of the beta coefficients.
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MBBCTIOS OF SIGNS OF BBGBESSION COBFFICIBNTS-CONTBOL VS PEBFOBHANCE
PEBFOBHANCE HEASUBE
JVPFIN JVPNOFIN JVPIND IJVP
US PT JV US PT JV US PT JV US PT JV
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Hypothesis 9.
The higher the level of cooperation between the 
partners, the higher would be the joint venture * s
performance.
This hypothesis was supported across all four measures 
of performance (R-squares range from 0.43 to 0.54 with 
matching p-values ranging from 0.006 to 0.055) (Table 
5.12).
Specifically, the common (across all four performance 
measures) significant dimensions of cooperation are (1) 
costing methods (2) reporting procedures, and (3) loan 
funds (financing). The signs of the beta coefficients show 
that joint venture performance would improve if there is 
agreement between partners with respect to costing methods 
and loan funds (financing). However, the beta coefficient 
for reporting procedures is negative, implying that an 
agreement on reporting procedures would decrease joint 
venture performance. This, perhaps, is due to the joint 
venture management’s need for autonomy (as established in 
the analysis of the control function above). Another 
reason could be the varying country reporting needs of the 
partners that would require different formats. A single 
format may, therefore, not serve their diverse needs.
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BEGBESSIOH SÜKMABÎ TÂBLE-COOPEBATION VS PEEPOEMANCE*lnl 
PESFOBHANCE HEASUBE





ÏDIVID 0.343U 0.305 0.206





XPPLAN 1.110**** 1.002*** 0.776***
( 3.71) ( 3.06) ( 3.12)
ÏQUAL -1.592**** -1.453 -1.072***
(-3.80) (-3.18) (-2.66)




ÏCOSTS 1.157***» 1.075*** 0.660*** 1.013***
( 3.54) ( 3.00) ( 3.39) ( 2.96)
XACCT -0.773*** -0.643** -0.514**
(-3.08) (-2.34) (-2.35)
Tims 1.140*** 0.937*** 0.836***





XBEPOBT -1.599**** -1.578**** -0.890**** -1.338****
(-4.14) (-3.73) (-3.54) (-3.55)
XEXIH 0.725**** 0.673**** 0.489***
( 4.19) ( 3.59) ( 3.07)
ILOANS 0.416** 0.414** 0.671***
( 2.37) ( 2.16) ( 3.21) ( 1.99)
R'SQDABE .54 .45 .44 .43
P-VALUE .009 .055 .006 .026
NE: I-values for beta coefficients in parentheses
s «t  significant at .001 ttt significant at .01 
** significant at .05 * significant at .10
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
For the financial, non-financial and the overall 
measures of performance, four other dimensions of 
cooperation are significant. These are (i) production 
planning, (2) quality control, (3) accounting procedures, 
(4) wage and labor policy, and (5) exports and imports. 
The signs of the beta coefficients show a positive 
relationship for production planning, wage and labor 
policy, and exports and imports, and an inverse 
relationship for quality control and accounting procedures. 
For the financial and non-f inancial measures, cooperation 
along the dimension of organization is significant with a 
positive sign. For the financial measure of performance, 
cooperation on dividend policy is significant with a 
positive sign. Finally, for the industry-level measure
of performance, other significant cooperation dimensions 
are (1) capital expenditure, (2) pricing, (3) marketing and 
sales and (4) purchasing. The signs of the beta 
coefficients show a positive relationship for pricing and 
inverse relationships for capital expenditure, marketing 
and sales and purchasing.
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EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS
The third set of hypotheses (10-13) examines the 
exploratory parameters of this study. These hypotheses 
relate to the interrelationships among the four intervening 
variables and how these inter-relationships affect 
performance.
Hypothesis 10;
IJVs with higher complementarity of contributed 
resources (COMPRES) and lower control by both partners 
(MCU/MCP), that is, higher IJV autonomy, would outperform 
those with lower complementarity in the resources 
contributed by partners and higher levels of control by the 
partners.








P O K T R O T .
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The hypothesis was supported for both the U.S. firms 
and the foreign partners. For this hypothesis, the test 
was Ho:cell 3 = cell 2 and Ha: cell 3 > cell 2. The
"t" calculated was 2.056 for the U.S. firm (Table 5.13) and 
2.77 for the foreign partner (Table 5.14). The null was, 
therefore, rejected at alpha=0.05 and 0.01 levels of 
significance with 20 and 14 degrees of freedom 
respectively. This result implies that the provision of 
highly complementary resources by the partners, matched by 
a low level of parent control or IJV autonomy, would result 
in higher ,UV performance.
Hypothesis 11:
IJVs formed by partners who have had favorable past 
associations and in which partners exercise less control, 
that is, a more autonomous IJV, would outperform those with 
partners who have had unfavorable past associations and in 
which the partners exercise higher levels of control.
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This hypothesis was supported. Ho: cell 3 = cell 2
was tested against Ha:cell 3 > cell 2. The "t" calculated 
was -1.55 for the U.S. firm and 1.78 for the foreign
partner. The null was rejected at alpha=0.10 with 14
degrees of freedom for the US firm (Table 5.15) and at 
alpha=0.05 for the partner with 19 degrees of freedom 
(Table 5.16). This may imply that regardless of the nature 
of the past relationship between partners, it is current
levels of control over important functional areas that
would enhance IJV performance.
Hypothesis 12.
IJV’s with higher complementarity of contributed 
resources and high levels of cooperation (CO) would 
outperform those with lower complementarity of contributed 
resources and low levels of cooperation.
















This hypothesis was supported (Table 5.17). Ho:cell 1 
= cell 4 was tested against Ha:cell 1 > cell 4. The "t" 
calculated was 1.56 with six degrees of freedom. The null 
was rejected at alpha=0.10. This implies that the 
contribution of highly complementary resources coupled with 
higher levels of cooperation would lead to higher IJV 
performance.
Hypothesis 12a:
IJVs in which partners have had more unfavorable past 
associations and higher levels of cooperation would 
outperform those in which partners have had favorable past
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
















This hypothesis was supported (Table 5.18). Ho: cell
2 = cell 3 was tested against Ha:cell 2 > cell 3. The "t" 
calculated was 1.42 at 24 degrees of freedom.
This supports the earlier finding (hypothesis 6c) on 
the relationship between past association and IJV 
performance. Past relationships do not seem to determine 
the outcome of current operations. This is also in line 
with Tomlinson's (1970) finding that favorable past 
association between partners only impacted performance in 
conjunction with other variables, like resource 
contributions.
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Hypothesis 13:
IJV’s with low levels of partner control, that is, 
high IJV autonomy, and high levels of cooperation would 
outperform those with high levels of partner control, or 















This hypothesis was supported for both the U.S. firms 
and the foreign partners. Ho: cell 3 = cell 2 was tested 
against Ha:cell 3 > cell 2. The "t" calculated was 1.89 
with 24 degrees of freedom for the U.S. firm (Table 5.21),
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and 1.59 with 13 degrees of freedom for the foreign partner 
(Table 5.22). The null was, therefore. rejected at 
alphas0.05 and 0.10 respectively. This implies that high 
levels of cooperation between partners accompanied by high 














The tests of hypotheses and findings presented above 
are summarized in Table 5.21 below.
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TABLE 5.21
SÜHHAEY OP EESBABCH HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS
QUEST HYP
# t EHPIEIUAL EESULTS AND COMMENTS
Q2
IMPACT OF GBA ON 
DECISION TO FOEM 
IJV
EXISTING AND POTENTIAL 
GEA DOMINANT. DIFFEEENTIAL IMPACT ON 
EUEOPEAN AND JAPANESE MNCS.
Q2
IMPACT OF BUSINESS 
FACTOES ON DECISION 
TO FOEM IJV
NEW MABKETS, LOCAL IDENTITY 













NOT SUPPOETED. EELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
EBP AND IJV PEEFOEHANCE NOT A SIMPLE 
ONE.
3,4 2 EBP. . . . JVBUS SUPPOETED.
3,4 2A EBP- - - - ÜEBUS SUPPOETED.
3,4 2B
EBP- - - COMPEES
SUPPOETED. POSITIVE EELATIONSHIP 
EVIDENCED. MF2 (TECHNOLOGY), MF4 
(MGT) i HFIO (STEONG MAEEET POSITION) 
SIGNIFICANT.
3,4 20 EBP- - - PASTASSO MF8 (FINANCE) SIGNIFICANT.
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QUEST B!î SBSEABCB
I t PHENOMENON EHPIBICAL RESULTS 1
3,13 3 EBP- - - SBLBO
SUPPORTED. POSITIVE EELATIONSHIP. 
EELSIZB SIGNIPICANÎ.
3,22 4
EBP- - - BCU
EBP- - - HOP
NOT SUPPORTED.
HOT SUPPOETED.




5 EBP- - - CO
NOT SUPPOETED.
4/
24,25 5 JVBUS-- PEEP NOT SUPPORTED.
4/







24,25 SC PASTASSO— PEEP NOT SUPPOETED.
13/
24,25
7 EELEO- - - - PEEP NOT SUPPOETED.
22/
24,25
8 HCU. . . . . PEEP
MCP. . . . . PEEP
SUPPOETED ACROSS ALL POÜE MEASURES. 
SUPPOETED ACROSS ALL POUE MEASURES.
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QUEST BY? SBSEABCB





































GSA— Goyersaeat regulations and/or attitudes.
EBP— Relative bargaining power of partners.
JVBUS— Partner in sane business as IJV.
UEBUS— Partner in saae business as U.S. fir».
COMPEES— Coapieaentarity of resources supplied by partners. 
PASTASSO— Past association between partners.
BELEO— Relative equity ownership.
MCU— Management control by U.S. firm.
MCP— Management control by foreign partner.
CO— Cooperation between partners.
PERF— Joint venture performance.
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Chapter VI
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND 
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the 
research findings and describe the implications of these 
findings. Furthermore, the limitations of the study are 
addressed and areas for further study delineated. The 
chapter is divided into four sections. The first 
section summarizes the research findings presented in
the previous chapter. The second section discusses the
implications of the findings for researchers and those 
managing IJVs. The third section addresses the 
limitations of the study, and the fourth delineates the 
areas for further study.
A. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Several important empirical findings come out of
this study. These are presented in the same order as
the hypotheses that were examined. The presentation of 
the summary results will be centered around the major 
issues examined in this study, namely, motivation for 
joint venture, bases for bargaining and outcomes of
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bargaining between partners, and bargaining outcomes and 
joint venture performance. The focus will be on issues 
that emerge from the research findings that would be 
meaningful for academicians, practitioners and 
government (lawmakers).
The first issue that the empirical findings provide 
insights into involves the role of motivational factors 
in the formation of IJVs. This research study examined 
the motivational factors from the perspectives of both 
foreign partners and US firms. The findings reveal 
that, from the standpoint of foreign partners, two 
groups of factors provide significant impetus for the 
formation of IJVs in the United States. These are (1) 
government regulations and/or attitudes towards foreign 
investment, and (2) the need for resources or assets 
possessed by local firms. Specifically, both potential 
and existing government regulations and attitudes 
stimulate the formation of IJVs in the United States. 
However, these factors are more significant for Japanese 
firms than for European firms.
In order of importance, access to local markets, 
the need to develop a local image, and diversification 
are the three most significant influences in the 
decision to engage in IJVs for both European and 
Japanese firms. The findings also reveal that: (1)
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Japanese firms have a greater need to develop a local 
image, and (2) are affected by fluctuations in foreign 
exchange rates to a greater extent than their European 
counterparts.
For U.S. firms engaged in IJVs, the need to acquire 
technology from the foreign partner is of paramount 
importance. This was followed by the need to attain 
market growth through increased scope of operations, and 
the need to save time by pooling resources. It is 
apparent from these findings that U.S. firms provide 
foreign MNCs access into U.S. markets in exchange for 
access to the technology possessed by the MNCs.
Thus, these findings extend foreign direct 
investment (FBI) theory in an important way. That is, a 
structure dimension has been added which explicitly 
accounts for the form the FDI takes and the factors that 
determine such structure. The determinants of FDI 
structure were found to be host government regulations 
and/or attitudes toward foreign investment and the 
inability of the MNC to engage in a self-sufficient 
operation due to the lack of resources needed for 
operating in the host country (M-Factors). Since the 
same factors have been found to motivate MNCs to enter 
into IJVs in the LDCs, the implication is that the IJV 
is a universal and viable form of business organization
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rather than a means for exploiting markets in LDCs.
Also, the findings modify the premise that MNCs 
need to acquire significant firm-specific advantages 
before internationalizing. Additionally, the prime 
motivations for IJV formation in the United States have 
been empirically identified to be government regulations 
and/or attitudes (GRA), access to local markets, 
development of a local image, foreign exchange rate 
fluctuations and technology.
Any integrated research framework should, ideally, 
include both structural as well as behavioral aspects in 
order to realistically study organizational situations. 
The behavioral issues assume even greater importance in 
the study of IJV performance because JVs, by definition, 
would involve multiple parties. The role of 
negotiation, bargaining, at cetera, are, therefore, 
important in studying IJVs. The second issue, 
therefore, focuses on the bases for bargaining between 
partners and the outcomes of bargaining.
The second issue that the empirical findings 
provide insights into relates to relative bargaining 
power and its outcomes for IJV. This issue falls into 
two categories. First, there is the relationship 
between RBP and IJV performance. The findings reveal 
that RBP does not significantly impact IJV performance.
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This implies that the relationship between RBP and IJV 
performance is not a direct or simple one and other 
factors intervene in this relationship. Second is the 
relationship between RBP and the outcomes of bargaining 
between partners— criteria for selecting partner, 
relative equity ownership, management control, and 
cooperation. The findings here appear to be mixed.
RBP is significantly and positively related to the 
four criteria for selecting partner: selection of
partner in IJV’s business, selection of partner in U.S. 
firm’s business, complementarity of resources
contributed to the IJV by partners, and past association 
between partners. RBP was also found to be
significantly and positively related to the level of 
equity ownership attained in the IJV.
However, RBP was not significantly related to the 
level of actual managerial control exercised by the 
partners or to the level of cooperation between them. 
This would imply that the level of RBP possessed by a 
partner does not necessarily lead to the exercise of 
managerial control over the IJV’s functions. That is, 
the potential control a partner could exercise as a 
result of its RBP may not be the same as the level of 
control actually exercised in an IJV. With respect to 
cooperation, the findings imply that the mere possession
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of a more superior RBP would not grant one partner the 
power to "force" the other partner to cooperate. This 
means that the notion of power enabling one to force 
another to do certain things as described in the 
organizational theory (OT) literature does not hold in 
IJV relationships. This, perhaps, could be rationalized 
by noting that the concept of power described in OT 
pertains to individuals or organizational sub-units, 
whereas in IJV the relationships examined here, the 
units of analysis are organizations and not individuals 
or sub-units.
The third broad issue involves the performance 
determinism of the four intervening variables 
(bargaining outcomes) in the research model. The 
intervening variables (bargaining outcomes) fall into 
four categories: (1) criteria for selecting partners; 
(2) relative equity ownership; (3) management control; 
and (4) cooperation. In terms of the criteria for 
selecting partners, the research findings indicate that 
selection of partners in the same business as the U.S. 
firm significantly, but negatively, impacted performance 
across all four performance measures used. The 
complementarity of resources contributed by partners was 
positively related only to the non-financial measure 
(JVPNOFIN). Finally, no relationship was found between
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(1) selection of a partner in the same business as the 
IJV, (2) the past association between the partners, and 
IJV performance. This implies that mere past success 
would not automatically ensure future success in' IJV 
relationships.
While past research examining IJVs in LDCs and DCs 
found the performance enhancing nature of relative 
equity ownership significant, this study did not find 
this to be significant for IJVs in the United States.
One could speculate that, perhaps, this is due to the
characteristics of the sample of IJVs studied. This
study focused solely on U.S.-based IJVs in the 
manufacturing industry (SIC 20-39).
The findings on management control indicated that
the U.S. firm, the foreign partner and IJV management
exercise control along different dimensions. The
findings for each party are summarized according to the 
performance measure used. For the U.S. firm, the 
results show that more control over (1) accounting 
procedures, and (2) exports and imports, and less 
control over (1) pricing and, (2) organization were 
related to higher performance across all four measures 
used. In addition, more U.S. firm control over 
production and less control over purchasing were
associated with higher financial performance. For
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JVPNOFIN, less control over administration of the IJV 
was associated with higher performance. Furthermore, 
more control over production planning and less control 
over (1) costing methods, and (2) wages were related to 
higher industry-related (JVPIND) and higher overall 
(IJVP) performance.
In the case of the foreign partner, the findings 
show that more control over budgeting and less control 
over (1) pricing, and (2) training were related to 
higher performance across all four measures. In 
addition, industry-related performance (JVPIND) was 
related to higher performance when the partner exercised 
more control over (1) purchasing, (2) wages, and (3)
reporting procedures and less control over 
administration.
For IJV management, IJV performance was higher 
across all four measures when IJV management exercised 
more control over (1) pricing, and (2) the selection, 
promotion and compensation of executives. Additionally, 
JVPFIN was higher when IJV management exercised more 
control over (1) production, (2) reporting procedures, 
and (3) exports and imports, and less control over (1) 
production planning, and (2) quality control. The 
findings on the control-perf ormance relationships 
described here clearly indicate that IJV partners and
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IJV management should exercise control only in selected 
areas in order to enhance IJV performance^ Such 
clearly-defined areas of control for each party should 
reduce the opportunity for goal blocking and conflict 
and lead to higher IJV performance.
For the fourth intervening variable, cooperation, 
performance was higher across all four performance
measures when there was more agreement between partners 
over (1) costs, and (2) loan funds (financing), and less 
agreement over reporting procedures. Also, for JVPFIN,
performance improved with more agreement over (1) 
dividend policy, (2) organization, (3) production
planning, and (4) wages, and less agreement over (1) 
quality control, and (2) accounting procedures. 
JVPNOFIN was higher when there was more agreement over 
(1) organization, (2) production planning, (3) wages,
and (4) exports and imports. For JVPIND, performance 
was higher when there was more agreement over pricing, 
and less agreement over (1) capital expenditures, (2) 
marketing, and (3) purchasing. Finally, for IJVP, 
performance was higher when there was more agreement 
over (1) production planning, (2) wages, and (3) exports 
and imports, and less agreement over (1) quality 
control, and (2) accounting procedures.
It is apparent from the above results that
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different dimensions of cooperation are to be managed in 
order to improve IJV performance. This set of 
dimensions also varies with the type of IJV performance 
measure that is to be enhanced.
The final issue on which empirical findings were 
made in this study relates to the combined effects of 
the intervening variables on IJV performance. 
Contingency or situational analysis has become popular 
in the study of organizational strategies. For example, 
2x2 matrices are prominent in strategy formulation. 
Using this approach, several interesting findings 
emerge. With respect to all pairwise combinations 
examined in this study, significant inter-cell IJVP 
differences were evidenced. For the 2x2 contingencies 
examined, the contingency that would lead to the highest 
IJV performance is described here.
Specifically, a high level of complementarity in 
the resources supplied to the IJV by the parents coupled 
with low parent control (i.e. IJV autonomy) resulted in 
higher IJV performance relative to other contingencies. 
Secondly, the nature of the past association between the 
partners was found not to affect performance when the 
partners granted the IJV management operational 
autonomy. Thirdly, IJV performance was found to be 
higher when there was high complementarity in the
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resources supplied by partners to the IJV and where 
there was high cooperation between the partners. 
Fourthly, high levels of cooperation in current IJV 
collaborations was found to lead to higher IJV 
performance in spite of unfavorable past associations 
between the partners. Finally, high cooperation between 
partners coupled with low parent control, or high IJV 
autonomy, was found to result in higher IJV performance.
The above results show that certain contingencies 
or contexts lead to better IJV performance than others. 
Thus IJV relationships should be managed in such a way 
that the contingencies or contexts that lead to better 
IJV performance predominate.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
As joint ventures proliferate, the need for a 
better understanding of their functioning becomes more 
imperative. Research on joint ventures thus far has 
focused mainly on questions of ownership and control 
because partners are having to share not only ownership 
but decision-making as well. It is apparent that joint 
ventures are here to stay and all predictions are that 
their use will increase in the foreseeable future
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(Harrigan, 1984; Killing, 1983; Gullander, 1976). For 
business organizations, the question of performance is a 
critical one and for joint ventures it is even more 
critical since one partner may not have control over all 
the important variables that determine performance.
The list of questions pertaining to IJVs is 
endless, and this study does not purport to provide all 
the answers. However, it does provide a better 
understanding of joint ventures and the determinants of 
their performance through the presentation of an 
integrative framework embodying contextual factors and 
the indication of the interconnections among these 
factors.
The contributions of this study are several and 
should be beneficial to academics, practitioners and 
governments (both state and national). Some of the 
particular contributions to these groups are detailed
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FOR ACADEMICS/RESEARCHERS 
* Theoretical Contribution:
- The research model presented in this study 
provides an integrative framework linking 
(1) the motivation for IJV, (2) bases for 
bargaining between partner and bargaining 
outcomes, and (3) the relationship
between bargaining outcomes and IJV 
performance.
- FDI theory has been conceptually extended
by explicitly including a structure dimension 
that accounts for the form FDI takes.
- This research identifies significant 
prerequisite conditions that provide the 
sufficient and necessary motivations for 
IJV formation in the United States.
- In terms of IJV theory development and 
testing, this study examines the bases, 
outcomes and performance implications of 
relative bargaining power.
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The study adopts an integrative research 
perspective that includes multiple 
determinants cf performance.
* Methodological contribution:
- Earlier studies on IJVs were predominantly 
done in the LDCs. This study examines the 
IJV phenomenon in the United States.
- This study uses contingency frameworks as 
a methodological means to identify 
contingencies or contexts that lead to 
higher IJV performance.
- It provides operational procedures for 
measuring the research constructs used 
in this study.
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FOR PRACTITIONERS
In general, there are two broad contributions to 
practitioners :
- This study provides a better basis for 
identifying the important variables that 
contribute to joint venture performance 
and indicates how to manipulate them for 
better results.
- The study shows which IJV control elements 
are to be emphasized and which are to be 
deemphasized in order to enhance IJV 
performance.
- The study indicates that cooperation is a 
prerequisite for higher IJV performance, 
rt also indicates which elements of 
cooperation need to be managed in order 
to achieve higher IJV performance.
Specifically, several managerially meaningful
assertions emerge from the research findings. These are 
presented here in the form of normative prescriptions
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that may be drawn from the study to guide managerial 
action. While the presentation of these ideas may sound 
rather definitive, it is conceded here that what is 
being aimed at is only "soft determinism" (Scherer, 
1980)-i.e, correct on the average, but subject to 
substantial error occassionally. It may be reiterated 
that the following is apt only for IJVs in the United 
States.
- For increasing IJV performance, both 
partners should provide it as much resources 
(specifically, R&D, raw materials and 
components) as possible.
- Three factors are predominantly affected 
by RBP. These are past history of 
association, present contributions to both 
equity and resources, and the degree of 
agreement (lack of conflict) in current 
IJV operations. Since past history is not 
a manipulable variable, partners with 
unfavorable past association should
(1) increase their present contributions 
and (2) refrain from interfering in the IJV’s 
operations in order to make it successful.
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- Finally, the research findings show that 
managing certain contingencies is a viable 
means to increase IJV performnce. 
Specifically, performance enhancing 
contingencies are identified empirically 
towards which managers may strive.
FOR GOVERNMENT
- This study identifies the role of existing 
and potential government regulations and/or 
attitudes as significant motivators for the 
formation of IJVs. This indicates 
that, besides the tangible infrastructural 
requirements, the intangible GRAs are 
significant factors that promote the 
formation of IJVs in the United States.
This implies that the role of government 
is very important, even though, unlike in 
the LDCs, direct governmental involvement 
in IJV formation is low.
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C. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Recognition of the limitations of this study is 
important because it qualifies and tempers the findings, 
and provides rationale for areas recommended for further 
study. The results of this study should be viewed in 
light of the following limitations:
1. IJVs in the United States represent only a small 
sub-set of possible international joint venturing 
efforts. Therefore, a replication of the study in other 
national settings would enhance the generalizability of 
the findings of this study.
2. The dynamics involved in joint venturing are not 
explored in this study. A longitudinal study to 
evaluate the changing nature of cooperation between 
parties to the IJV over time would be desirable. An 
interesting outcome of such research efforts would be an 
empirical documentation of a "cooperation lifecycle" in 
IJVs.
3. This study is based on the perceptions of the U.S. 
partners. It may be desirable, if resources permit, to 
elicit the perceptions of foreign partners and the IJV
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managers to better understand the IJV phenomenon from 
the standpoint of these multiple stakeholders.
D. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Future research on IJVs can develop along several 
dimensions. Two general approaches are recommended 
here. The first approach would address the limitations 
of this study so as to develop a more robust and 
self-corrected theory of the IJV phenomenon. The second 
approach involves the investigation of other equally 
interesting ramifications of the IJV phenomenon in a 
conscious effort to develop a more comprehensive and 
cohesive body of knowledge about the IJV phenomenon.
On the basis of the limitations of this study 
enumerated earlier, the first approach suggests the 
expansion of the scope of this study through multiple 
replications in different countries in order to 
reinforce its generalizability. Such expansions would 
involve the incorporation of other relevant variables of 
interest to managers. Perhaps such future research 
efforts would lead to an integrated research stream 
with action-oriented implications for the better
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
management of IJVs.
The second approach is more speculative in that it 
provides for an unfettered journey of the mind into the 
possible ramifications of this study. Several of these 
are listed below.
1. Is there a "country" effect on the IJV phenomenon?
That is, do IJVs in LDCs differ from IJVs in developed
countries? If yes, how do these differences manifest 
themselves in the actual management of IJVs and the 
contributions made by partners? Specifically, there is 
a need for the examination of the international 
differences in production functions. The objective will 
be to determine the level of technological complexity 
along which comparative analysis can be undertaken 
between and within industries and across international 
boundaries.
2. The stakeholder approach, involving all parties in 
an IJV, would enrich the understanding of the IJV 
phenomenon. This would bring to the surface conflicting 
goals and objectives and how they are managed in IJVs.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3. Just as the research stream explored certain 
prerequisite conditions that would be conducive to 
innovation and entrepreneurship, one may explore the 
issue of prerequisite infrastructural motivators that 
would promote the formation of IJVs.
4. The inducements and contributions theory of 
Barnard (1938) may also be explored as an interesting 
research stream in IJVs to identify the inducements and 
contributions of the parties involved.
5. The tradeoff between economies of scale and 
economies of scope would be an interesting research 
theme. That is, should MNCs grow through size or 
through variety?
6 . Is there an IJV lifecycle just like the popular 
product lifecycle? That is, are IJVs enduring entities 
that are infused with newer and newer technologies as 
older technologies become obsolete?
7. Globalization is an intensifying trend in the 
1980s (e.g,: the auto industry). What role do IJVs play 
in the internationalization (global networking) of major 
industries. What factors induce the location of nodes
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in such global networks? That is, what determines the 
location of production activity and what are the 
consequences of such a trend at the societal level (for 
example, "the hollowing of America" as articulated by 
Morita. Chairman of Sony, in 1986).
8. Do IJVs reduce or enhance competition? Are they 
implicit mechanisms of collusion among incumbents in an 
industry?
9. Certainly all IJVs are not homogeneous. A study 
could focus on a classification scheme for IJVs to 
develop a conceptual taxonomy which may be empirically 
validated subsequently.
10, Joint venturing is a phenomenon that cuts across 
various levels of analysis. This research examined 
international joint ventures. However, domestic JVs 
(e.g. IBM and NYNEX) are also quite prominent forms of 
business enterprise. Thus, the JV phenomenon may be 
studied not only at each level of analysis, as done in 
this study, but also across levels of analysis in a 
comparative mode.
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11. Since IJVs present opportunities for the 
dissipation of firm-specific advantages (FSA) possessed 
by partner firms, it would be insightful to study the 
strategies partners use to prevent, or slow down, the 
dissipation of their FSA.
Finally, it is hoped that this study would (1) 
provide impetus to further research on IJVs, (2) lead to 
a closer examination of IJVs as a viable strategic 
management option for both national and multinational 
firms, and (3) assist in the accumulation of a knowledge 
base on the joint venture phenomenon.
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Division of Research and Development
College of Business Administration
L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  and agricultural and mechanical college
BATON ROUGE • LOUISIANA • 70803-6318
M388-6640
October 22, 1985
Your assistance is required in a study of international joint 
ventures in the United States between firms such as yours and 
foreign partners.
Please indicate on the attached form the number of joint ventures 
in which you are engaged in the United States with foreign 
partners and the name(s) of the executive(s) in your company to 
whom questions relating to the joint ventures should be 
addressed.
Please return the form in the enclosed envelope. The executive(s) 
you list will receive a questionnaire shortly after you have 
returned the form.
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Name of Joint venture
Executive In Your Firm To Contact 
for Information on Joint Venture
Please check here if you have no joint ventures in the U.S. 
with foreign partners.
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Small Business Development Center
3139 CEBA
L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  and agricultural and mechanical college
BATON ROUGE • LOUISIANA • 70803-633? Tfu / 3SS-<W<!0
January 2, 1986
Dear Mr.
Perhaps my earlier letter soliciting your help with our study of 
international joint ventures in the United States was overlooked 
in your hectic year-end activities. I am renewing my request 
since your help is indispensable to our study. The study is an 
attempt to catalog the experiences of US firms like yours with 
joint ventures operating in the US and involving foreign partners 
in an effort to (1) gain a better understanding of these joint 
ventures and (2) develop new management strategies for 
structuring and operating such joint ventures.
Please indicate on the attached form the joint ventures you are 
(or have been) engaged in in the United States with foreign 
partners and the name of the executive(s) in your company to whom 
questions relating to the joint ventures should be addressed.
Please return the form in the enclosed envelope. The executive(s) 
you list will receive a questionnaire shortly after you have 
returned the form.
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Louisiana Small Business Development Center
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Small Business Development Center
3139 CEEA
L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  and agricultural and mechanical college
BATON ROUGE • LOUISIANA • 70803-6337 504,388-8480
February 5, 1986
Dear Mr.
Mr. President of has consented to
take part in our study of intematioinal joint ventures operating 
in the United States and has directed that the enclosed 
questionnaire be sent to you for completion for your joint 
venture, . Please fill it out
completely and return it as soon as possible in the enclosed 
envelope.
The questionnaire was designed to take as little of your time as 
possible and require mainly that you check or circle items. All 
information provided will be kept in strict confidence.
I shall be glad to send you a copy of the Executive Summary of 
this study. Just indicate in the appropriate section at the end 
of the questionnaire that you would like a copy.




Ben L. Kedia 
Faculty Advisor
Sponsored by; State of Louisiana 
Louisiana Small Business Development Center
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BATON ROUGE • LOUISIANA • 70803^3? 5W/3SS-S4SÜ
February 5, 1986
Dear Mr.
Your company's willingness to participate in our study of 
intematioinal joint ventures operating in the United States is 
greatly appreciated. Enclosed is the questionnaire to be filled 
out for your joint venture, • Please
fill it out completely and return it as soon as possible in the 
enclosed envelope.
The questionnaire was designed to take as little of your time as 
possible and require mainly that you check or circle items. All 
information provided will be kept in strict confidence.
I shall be glad to send you a copy of the Executive Summary of 
this study. Just indicate in the appropriate section at the end 
of the questionnaire that you would like a copy.




Ben L. Kedia 
Faculty Advisor
Sponsored by; State of Louisiana 
Louisiana Small Business Development Center
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T1 Small Business Development Center3139 CEEA
L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y  amd agricultural and mechanical college
BATON ROUGE • LOUISIANA • 70803-633?
March 27, 1986
Dear Mr.
Enclosed is a copy of the questionnaire we talked about this 
afternoon. Please fill it out completely and return it as soon 
as possible in the enclosed envelope.
The questionnaire was designed to take as little of your time as 
possible, requiring mainly that you check or circle items. All 
information provided will be kept in strict confidence.
I shall be glad to send you a copy of the Executive Summary of 
the results. Just indicate in the appropriate section at the end 
of the questionnaire that you would like a copy.
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Winston Awadzi 
Project Director (504) 388-6645
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Faculty Advisor 
(504)388-6645
College of Business Administration 
Louisiana State University Baton Rouge, LA 70803
November, 1985
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teCMS to loam fundf/capital/prafarantial traataeat
I. To attaoliib "local • imagti 
». Otralop nat aarkets:
F .  Futura protection of aiiiting aarkati 
Mattb cô atitors!
I. Obtain rss aatarialsi 
t. Saographlcal oivaraificationi 
j. Ovarcoae tariff barritrii 
I. Reduca transpxUtion conta»
I. fortign Rctiangt fluctuation»
1. To obtain tachnology froi you- firai 
u To attain/inraa* coat affidancy thrcugb joint prodistieai 
I. Otnar raaiooa (plaaaa apacify)---------------- ;—
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3. Ulocitt 100 minis bibMii yott and raur prtair IPWff) to iadiuti tkt RBATIVE ntmt to tdiich wdl CONIRIBUIED the 
resoircti lilted bolec. (For cnaple, FMMCEi W-75; PMinO*21| IOTM.-100). Indlcets the IMPIKTMT RLE cedi factor 
playM In the EELECTIiW of your partmr by CÜSUNE ONE nueber.
a. Memt/tacilitwi:
b. Technology (including patentili
e. Technical (wnomeli
a. Eitabliihed braMit
f. Chanmeli of diitributiooi
i. hateriUs/coaponentii
j. Strong airket poiitim:
k. Patents/licencssi
1. Capacity ta proride local identity:
a. Bovemeent relaticni:
0. Other: (Pleast cpecify)
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i. PlHsi IIROE (ME OMbtr to iMÜate tht IiratTMCE ef tu, folWot i* saKTIIC TOUT prtMr.
iipartMit itrartint
In sane line of business as proposed JV:
In sane line of business as you* 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Resovces/facilities cnepleeentery to these of your fire: 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Site of partner:
nationality of partner: 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Favorable past assodatien (ex. agent, licensee): 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Stnerai soundness of partner: 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Other reasons* (Please specify) 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
»o Mdi ti» first #proKA or swRaüon rogaiisg * i¥ and ii wwt ytar?
a. tour coipanyï________  k. Y#ar:_
1. tour Partnart______  b. Y#ir:__
a. Son other party: (please specify)____________
, tkm aany years had you tnoM y«r partner BEFORE the JV was f creed? ______ Years.
, Hut mas the nature of this prior knooiodqe («. cuftooar, supplier etc.)____________________________
, ttM long ad you negotiate with your partner BEFORE tiM JV was fcreed? Please CIROE one Use period below.
a. Less than 1 year: b. 1-2 yrsi c. 2-Î yrsi d. 3-4 yrw t. 4-5 yrs: f. S-6 yrst |. 6+ yrs:
, Mrs the negotiations longer/shorter then, or noreel for your fire? a. longer: k. Horaali c. Shorter:
). were other potential partners available? a. Yes: b. Me: If Yes, how many?_______
II. To «hat extent oid you negotiate with the other potential partners?
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Yes Reyte le
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13. swt li ti» WESBff distribution of equity ountrrtlp lo tin JV7 «.Your coupooyi % b. hrtRun %
14. OMt «M tiw equity Oistrloutlco Aon tie JV first started? «. Your couposyi % u. rortoon %
15. ttwt is vaut cespsny’s MBEMIED level of equity ouRershlp Is « iV? Pleese CKSX 9^btlou.
«. uiîii 8 UCAL porter; lujorityi Gqusli Hnorltyi Ho prefroocot
0. 01th « FOREIGN portnuri Msjoityi Equili Hlnorltyi Ho preferoocu:
16. Hou IMPORTANT Is «iiorlty equity omrsMlp Is « JV to yor coopony?
17. Mease UKK t/the SERVICES tht bive been CONTRACTED tdtb tbs JV either by your coopany or your partner. 














Purchase of JV’s output:
Other: (please spKlfy)
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Ht ef ttd i mnONtm tn  m lv t t i  «t mch Itw l W»s?




». To ohtt Binr ooMtteW *p#xl «  MOTTEN PGUCIES to gel<# It# dKlHon^ng? Circle OK nu*tr fir etch.
CIRCU UE Miast FORt net tt til • little trtenfinly
t. free your tô itnyi 1 2  3 4 5 4 7 .
». free pytoeri 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
24. In t typiol tenth, HON onoi are moiyer# It the JV centecteV by oeut of teleohone, telex, letter or visit*?
ciRat UE amKR fdri
t. Itur C39pe>i 7 6 5
». Partner, 7 6 5
21. Etployinj the tetie tiloe, |letw DECK f/ HH CFTEN the JV «
TOYOFCOIWW






2. alloat* 100 MUNIS tatatn you, yo» yarti 
£AOi tiirutH imrmi ov*r th* liNtW fumctian#. 
(you, pirtixr or JV) ElfUHS tte EXECUTIVE ii-dwrj*
to intieato too fSJtnVE EDENT to Miich 
(El. mCIA YOMO, MR)-20t JV-N; TOT«l«lO0>. OBX IV) 
of EXOi TwcUn. M m  IMIcato tk* IfflMTMBE e< «adi (m
EXERCISE (F CONTia UPSRTAKK 8F «JCnS!! T5 ÏSK f:RI
UUiUIIVt WVUMk
OF EKK FUCTHM
■ iM nursi (P19I6E QBX (/]
TSU PART. JV iMortiat Inportant liportan









Ccïüng Mtlndii 4 5 6 7
Budgetary Cdntrol:
Accounting pronduritt
Wag* and laPdr policy:








2J. a. Mat (wrcntagt o< Htcrlalf/intoratdiitM ooh It* JV get (row 1. Too_
k. knit porcntaqi of tto JV*i outgut ii nggllM tot 1. Teu__
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24. For tht t in t sctlr UapcrUnct) CIKIB UE tita 
tmi JV* PERFOtgwCE. For tht iteontf tctlt, ( 
on the liettd ftctor* «et year EffECTATlOIS.
9. Acqtusitioo/u*e of p*t«nt*/Ucen*e»i
i ISa TO WICH EXPECTSTIOe hET 
tClROEDEFCREACHKASWE]
1 2 5 4 5 6 7 B 9 W
I 2 3 4 5 * 7 B 9 JO
J 2 3 4 5 6 7 B 9  10 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 B 9 JO
1 2 3 4 9 0 7 8 9  10 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  i0 
1 2 3 4 a 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
25. Mette rite the PERFORMANCE of thi* JV RELATIVE to iti COfETlTORS ilong the follotim; diaeniionsi
Return on tsset 
Ssrtet share 
Sales groath
26. Do you perceive the returns fro* the JV as being equitably distributed, i.e. is line aith:
a. Your contributions? Yes:______  No:_____
b. Your partner’s contributions? Yes:______ No:_____
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M o»t*n la» WSflaŒBBlTS atorrfi «ith yur pirtocr ovr tht {ollwdng itM t? Plttit CHECKt/tht«













Ha;t and Itoor policy:
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29. To Kilt UIEMT iMvo tn# tollodog bfti oiW dtMr Ir  rw or |oir pirtMr? Mono K R  tkt ippropriitt celum.
mver rarely R«ly SUtUlH Often VaryOftu Always
ChiUtngs ef eedsiSRst
veto power:
Nitholaini contributions to JV:
bithdrwfl of personmti from JV:
Eitrgency oofd meetings:
iittrtrtnct uitk JV's operations:
Negative sanctions: 
fPftast discus)
It LEWLS of COOPERATION bft«Mn yoi M  ytnr prtMr by plicing • CNER in tht
Wgh High Average Lou
Wry
Before the JV agreeaent:
During the early years:
Daring later years:
At present:
ji. Wilt If tht txiftimg Itnl of TRUST bttMKi you and yow pvtnr?
firy hijk «Kiritt nont
J2. Mould you Mdtrtiki anothir JV with your prnnt pirtnir? Ttii  toi  IHybti____
a. On you fnl tiit JW «ith foreign partners sro a satisfeAcry osans of doiiig buftnm in tht US? Ttti Not 
PlNit nplain your anweri ' ■■ ■" ■- ■ ■■■■■ - - - ... .
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J». «Ml» prorite t» fellBdnii
«. Toor cAirf orcdortii SIC CMti___
t. cMtf prooactsi____________________________________ IK Cote;___
c. PirtMT’i ehiof iroductit SIC Cote;___
& Portow'i HMt_______________________________________  SoUom#litn_
I. JV’i MMi TMr <orood:_
i. 1. «Mtts ($ HUisa S. iüst » siUies; 3. &A:
«. Totol nuteor ôf jVt ysu «t onfifte Im loi lo tW tEi________  k. Oatilte tht !»;_
nWK TOU FOR YM amMTIDN
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Winston Swashie Awadzi was born in Lagos, Nigeria, 
on February 9, 1941. Both of his parents were
Ghanaians. When he was six years old, the family moved 
back to Ghana.
After graduating from the Accra Academy with the 
General Certificate of Education (Advanced Level) in 
June, 1962, Winston taught at the Aquinas College and at 
the Nungua Secondary School. He joined the Ghana News 
Agency as a Sub-Editor on the Africa-Europe Desk in 
1965. In March, 1966, Winston was awarded a certificate 
in Professional Journalism after completing a course of 
study with the African Journalism Institute of the 
International Federal of Journalists based in Brussels, 
Belgium.
In December, 1968, Winston passed the examinations 
of the British Institute of Public Relations, London, 
and was awarded the Institute’s Associate Certificate. 
In April, 1969, he joined the Ghana subsidiary of the 
London-based S.H. Benson International Limited as an 
Account Executive. Following the banning of foreign 
firms from the public relations and advertising sectors
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of Ghana’s economy in 1971, Winston was invited to set 
up an in-house Advertising Department for Benson’s major 
client- the Pioneer Tobacco Company, a subsidiary of the 
British-American Tobacco Group. By August, 1973, 
Winston had decided to leave his job with the Pioneer 
Tobacco Company to pursue further studies in the United
He arrived in the United States on a cold January 
day in 1974, and enrolled at the Louisiana State 
University for the Spring semester. By the end of the 
semester, he was sure he had made the right decision. 
He went back home and brought his wife, Susie, and their 
two children, Winston, Jr. and Jacqueline.
Winston graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree 
in b'ârketîng in December, 1976. He started the Master’s 
degree program at LSU but transferred to the University 
of New Orleans (UNO) for the Fall of 1977. He graduated 
from UNO with a Master of Business Administration degree 
in May, 1978 and a Master of Arts in Economics degree in 
May 1979.
Winston joined the faculty of Xavier University in 
New Orleans as an Instructor in August, 1979. In 
August, 1982, he started the Ph.D program at LSU on a 
part-time basis. After a year of commuting, he decided 
it would be better to move back to Baton Rouge and
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become a full-time student.
Winston was a Graduate Teaching Assistant at LSU 
from August, 1983 until June, 1986 when he was made an 
Instructor. At present, he is an Assistant Professor at 
Southern University in Baton Rouge.
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